Editorial. 383 



For me the possibility of a science of comparative psychology 

 is established by the observation (a fact of experience!) that we do 

 react differently to w^hat we infer to be conscious and unconscious 



J 



beings, differently to beings which we infer to have differing grades 

 or kinds of consciousness, differently again to the same being as 

 we infer its states of consciousness to change. Who would deny 

 that our inferences concerning pain in other animals influence our 

 behavior, and who, even among the objectivists, would deny the 

 possibility of validity to our inferences ? 



For the settlement of this dispute about comparative psychology, 

 far more important than the discussion of an objective nomencla- 

 ture is the recognition of the differences between the materials of 

 nerve physiology and comparative psychology. The former deals 

 directly and exclusively with objective phenomena, the neural pro- 

 cesses, necessarily assuming the existence of consciousness; the 

 latter deals with subjective phenomena as indicated by the struc- 

 ture and behavior of the animal. Both are divisions of biology; 

 neither, so far as I can see at present, can be complete without the 

 other. The physiologist does well to criticise the crudity and in- 

 exactitude of the psychologist's methods, as the psychologist does 

 to point out to the physiologist the assumptions upon which his 

 science rests, but neither gains anything by denying the possibility 

 of the other's science. 



Comparative psychology rests upon a system of inferences, from 

 objective phenomena to subjective phenomena. Either kind of 

 phenomenon may be a sign or indication of the other. In all natu- 

 ral sciences inferences from such signs are constantly employed. 

 Our inferences concerning consciousness in other beings, it 

 may be pointed out for the benefit of von Uexkull and those who 

 agree with him, are unescapable, for even in the construction of 

 their objective terminology scheme, Beer, Bethe and von Uex- 

 kull necessarily assumed that certain other beings are conscious 

 of the objective facts they wish to designate and are capable of 

 using terms as they do. In other words, we affirm the validity 

 and prove the necessity of inferences concerning consciousness 

 in our fellow beings every time we speak. The logical result of 

 the denial of the possibility of comparative psychology is speech- 

 lessness. Even those who claim that animals are automata do 

 not treat them as such. 



To object to the arguments just advanced that human psychcl- 



