Editorial. 387 



that organism. The evidence in favor of the existence of some 

 form of consciousness in most animals, not to mention plants, is 

 so abundant, however, that it furnishes a grade of certainty upon 

 which we do not hesitate to act; consequently it is fair to say that 

 the burden of proof in this matter rests with the scientist who denies 

 that the earthworm, the fish, the frog, the mouse may feel pain. 



When we turn to the second question, we find that no one has 

 ever succeeded in demonstrating that consciousness is unimportant 

 for behavior. We have to admit that we do not know whether it 

 is an epiphenomenon or not. Such being the status of our knowl- 

 edge, the student of animal behavior is justified, if he chooses, in 

 attempting to describe behavior in objective terms; he is not justi- 

 fied, however, in holding that subjective terms are unnecessary, 

 unless he has succeeded m describing completely all forms of 

 behavior in objective terms. Now, it is just this assumption that 

 theadvocates of the objective nomenclature and many other students 

 of animal behavior have made. In opposition to their position, 

 I wish to contend that although extreme anthropomorphism is un- 

 desirable because it tends to hide ignorance of objective phenomena 

 with which we should be familiar — to say that the moth has the 

 instinct to fly into the flame no longer satisfies the student of animal 

 behavior — the complete avoidance of subjective terms in descrip- 

 tions of behavior is impossible in the present state of our knowl- 

 edge, and undesirable so long as we act as if sense impressions 

 influence an animal's actions. I should further contend that it is 

 wise to extend the use of objective terms in animal behavior as 

 rapidly as possible, but that we lose more than we gain by trying to 

 force our observations into objective descriptions before our knowl- 

 edge of the objective phenomena w^arrants such procedure. 



As it happens, I am far more deeply interested in the forms and 

 conditions of animal behavior than in the existence of conscious- 

 ness in connection with that behavior or its relation thereto. It 

 seems to me, however, that the study of behavior will be furthered 

 by the recognition of the fact that we have no right to assume that 

 the subjective state need not be considered by the student of 

 behavior. The investigation of function, as well as of structure, is 

 absolutely necessary for the development of comparative psychol- 

 ogy, hence we do well at present to devote ourselves to a study of 

 the facts which constitute the bases of inferences concerning con- 



