388 "Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 



sciousness rather than to the discussion of inferences whose bases 

 we are not able to evaluate. Comparative psychologists too often 

 try to put the cart before the horse, so often in fact that most natu- 

 ral scientists have lost faith in their ability to progress and are 

 inclined to ignore their work. ' 



Practically, we are interested in what an animal feels, it matters 

 not whether that animal be a man, a horse, a dog, only if its con- 

 scious state influences its action, for what we must know in order 

 to be able to adjust our life to its life is how it acts and why. If 

 consciousness is a part of the why, it is important that we should 

 know that fact and enough more to enable us to predict the be- 

 havior of the animal. Obviously every student of animal behavior 

 must be a comparative psychologist and every comparative psy- 

 chologist first of all must be master of the science of activity. 



The position which I have attempted to defend in this paper may 

 be described summarily as follows. The useof an objective nomen- 

 clature in nerve physiology and in animal behavior is both desir- 

 able and necessary and the more consistently such a nomencla- 

 ture can be adhered to the better. In the latter science, however, 

 we are confronted with the question. Is this animal conscious and 

 if so does that influence its behavior } If this question has to be 

 answered in the affirmative in both parts, it is obviously impossible 

 for the student of animal behavior to avoid the use of subjective 

 terms. All natural sciences assume the existence of consciousness; 

 they diff"er in the limits which they set for it. We treat certain ob- 

 jects as if they were conscious, others as if they were not. It is the 

 business of the comparative psychologist to investigate the reasons 

 for our inferences concerning consciousness in other beings and to 

 evaluate the bases of these inferences. The inferences exist and 

 they are unescapable, hence it is not only legitimate but also 

 desirable to bring into full consciousness the objective facts which 

 condition them. These facts are what may be called structural 

 and functional signs of mind. The thorough study of the form 

 and behavior of an organism is absolutely necessary as a prepara- 

 tion for inferences concerning the experience of the organism. 

 We can never prove the existence of consciousness in any other 

 than our own organism, but we can in certain cases obtain evidence 

 which makes the probability of its existence as great as the proba- 

 bility of many of the facts with which other natural sciences deal. 

 Too often the psychologist speculates as to the existence and form 



