390 journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 



cation of the phenomena. In this view of the matter comparative 

 psychology finds itself deahng with a certain rangeof facts, which, 

 like nerve action, are modes of activity and must be interpreted 

 as such, but which in addition pass currently under other names — 

 as conscious behavior, subjective facts, ejective phenomena. The 

 sort of behavior for which these terms stand is a more complex 

 kind of activity than that ordinarily treated under the categories 

 of nerve physiology, but the method of describing them and the 

 point of view from which they must be explained are the same. 

 All the so-called mental facts of the universe can be explained 

 only as they are reduced to terms of this common denominator 

 of action. This is the history of the progressive transformation 

 of the so-called philosophical or normative into exact sciences. 

 This does not mean that these mental or spiritual phenomena are 

 nothing more than the chemical and physical processes to terms 

 of which we seek to reduce them. It simply means that we there- 

 by find the bond of identity which therein reveals the two sets of 

 facts as interrelated in a common system. It is simply taking 

 seriously the demonstrable dynamic and organic character of the 

 universe as we have found it up to date. The peculiar permuta- 

 tions and complications which activity exhibits in what are called 

 the subjective or mental phenomena will find specific statement, 

 to be sure, by reason of this greater complexity and this will be 

 the respect in which comparative psychology will find a distinct 

 field and method. But there is to be no schism methodologically 

 corresponding to the ontological chasm between mind and matter 

 which has vitiated so much scientific inquiry in the past. Cate- 

 gories are simply tools; laws and principles are merely the con- 

 ceptual shorthand for observed uniformities in the behavior of the 

 universe in certain regions and situations. And comparative 

 psychology is distinctive solely by reason of the fact that it is seek- 

 ing to describe and explain an as yet more ambiguous portion of 

 these observed uniformities than nerve physiology. To seek to 

 restrict this science to the instruments elaborated to deal with a 

 more limited and simpler subject-matter is to prejudge the entire 

 outcome from the start. This, as it appears to the present writer, 

 is the true defense of the independent position of comparative 

 psychology, and a defense which at the same time admits the 

 main contention of the advocates of the objective method. 



H. HEATH BAWDEN. 



