BAWwDEN, Psychological Theory of Evolution. 257 
consciousness. We cannot get at the nature of these simpler 
types of consciousness directly. But we can reconstruct the 
evolution of the primitive consciousness from a study of the 
evolution of organic structure and froma study of the conscious 
acts of the living organisms about us. 
The theory of most biologists is that the characteristic be- 
haviour of organisms began as purely mechanical activities in 
the presence of stimuli, among which certain useful reactions 
have been preserved by natural selection, consciousness appear- 
ing at some comparatively late period in the evolution of or- 
ganic structure. A few writers, however, have opposed this 
view. Its ablest critic, perhaps, is the late Professor Cope, in 
his ‘‘Origin of the Fittest’ (1887) and his ‘‘Primary Factors of 
Organic Evolution” (1895). His view is that the primitive cell 
was the conscious cell, and that consciousness is coextensive 
with all progressive evolution of organic structure, i. e., with 
all ‘‘anagenesis’’ as opposed to ‘‘catagenesis.”’ All organic 
structure, he holds, has been built up in the first instance with 
the accompaniment of consciousness. The impregnable argu- 
ment of his theory is based on the fact that in all cases where 
we have the opportunity of observing the origin and growth of 
the reactions of organisms we find that they have to be learned, 
and that they become automatic only after a more or less pro- 
longed period of conscious education.’ 
1 The metaphysical setting of Professor Copr’s theory, as he states it in 
the works above mentioned, is objectionable. In two important points his state- 
ment is open to criticism, (1) in his statement that consciousness is an attribute 
of matter, and (2) in his conception that consciousness is an additional factor 
in evolution. 
To speak of the latter point first. If by factors of evolution is meant sim- 
ply observed uniformities in growth processes, the law of the emergence of 
consciousness under certain conditions of organic growth may surely be placed 
alongside of the laws of natural selection, use-inheritance, sexual selection, 
etc. But it is one thing to speak of a law of consciousness being a factor, and 
quite another thing to speak of consciousness itself as a factor of evolution. 
Moreover, Professor COPE does not adhere to this meaning of factors of evolution, 
but falls into the error of confusing factors in the sense of observed uniform- 
ities with factors in the sense of the realities which evolve. In other words, he 
views factors as efficient causes. 
He contrasts his own theory with that of Mr. HuxLey who maintains that 
