258 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY. 
It must be noted that this theory makes no dogmatic asser- 
tions as to the exact distribution of consciousness in the organic 
realm. All evolution is not progressive. There is catagenesis 
as well as anagenesis, degeneration as well as generation. It is 
conceivable that there are degenerate forms in which conscious- 
ness seldom or never appears because the conditions of con- 
sciousness are no longer fulfilled. The theory holds simply 
that consciousness is always present at the initiation of new 
forms of activity on the part of organisms. 
Various criteria have been advanced for the presence of 
consciousness in the reactions of organisms. The most common 
and popular criterion is the purposefulness of the conscious act. 
If an animal, or even a single organ, reacts as a man would do 
under the same circumstances, the act is regarded as conscious. 
The application of this criterion has led certain writers to in- 
clude instincts and reflexes among conscious acts, and con- 
the consciousness of the bruteis related tothe mechanism of its body asa 
collateral product of its working, and is as ‘completely without any power of 
modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of 
the locomotive-engine is without influence on its machinery.” The volition of 
the brute, if it has any, he says, ‘‘is an emotion indicative of physical changes, 
not the cause of such changes.’’ Professor COPE, on the other hand, in his 
doctrine of archaesthetism, maintains ‘‘that consciousness as well as life pre- 
ceded organism, and has been the frémum mod:le in the creation of organic 
structure.” ‘‘I think it possible to show,’’ he says, ‘‘that the true definition of 
life is, energy directed by sensibility, or by a mechanism which has originated 
under the direction of sensibility. If this is true, the two statements that life 
has preceded organism, and that consciousness has preceded organism, are co- 
equal expressions.’’ (Primary Factors of Organic Evolution, p. 513). 
Now neither HuXLEy nor CopE, it seems to me, has the true conception of 
the relation of consciousness to evolution. Consciousness is neither~ effect nor 
cause. The psychical is not a form of energy at all. Consciousness is a func- 
tion, not a thing, not an entity. Consciousness rather expresses the meaning 
of evolution when it is progressive. Consciousness zs evolution in its construet- 
ive or anagenetic phase. Consciousness is the growing-point of evolution. 
In what has been said, Professor Copr’s second point, that consciousness 
is an attribute of matter or a certain behaviour of matter, as he also calls it, has 
implicitly been met. He evidently does not mean here that consciousness is 
meaning or significance, though the terms ‘‘attribute’’ and ‘‘behaviour” might 
be interpreted in that sense. What he means must be something coherent with 
his doctrine of archaesthetism which makes consciousness a factor in the sense 
of an efficient cause in evolution, and this canception certainly is indefensible. 
