BawbvEN, Psychological Theory of Evolution. 265 
A thousand complicated economic and social relations enter 
into the spreading of the feast to which the civilized man sits 
down at every meal, while the hunger of the bivalve must, for 
the most part, await the food that chance throws in its way; 
there is comparatively little use even of approximate, not to 
speak of remote, means to achieve this end. 
By the primitive consciousness, things, objects, situations, 
are taken in their immediacy. It is only in a highly developed 
consciousness that one thing comes clearly to stand for another 
thing, or that memory images and constructive ideas split apart 
the inchoate present intoa definitely recognized past and future. 
It is because of this relative immediacy of the animal conscious- 
“ness that men are loath to credit him with the ability to form 
judgments. The distinction of substantive and adjective, of 
fact and meaning, of the given and the problematic, can arise 
only where the knife-edge of the present has expanded so as to 
admit within it the distinction of past and future mediated by 
memory and imagination. These certainly are not found in the 
animal consciousness as they are found in man. But though 
they are not found there clearly and definitely, may they not 
be there vaguely? May they not be there sufficiently for the 
purpose in view—namely, the adaptation of the organism in 
the given situation? We must not fall into the historical fallacy 
of reading human traits back into the animal consciousness. 
But, on the other hand, is there not a counter danger, that in 
the attempt to avoid this error we fail to give the lower animals 
their due? It is a query worth some serious consideration. 
Many writers deny that animals have any power of project- 
ing purposes of ends, holding that in their case the action flows 
directly from the given conditions without any consciousness 
on the part of the animal of those purposes or ends. Yet these 
same writers will admit that animals probably feel, experience 
pleasure and pain. But why should the feeling of pain or pleas- 
ure ever arise if it did not serve some useful purpose for the 
protection and survival of the organism? And of what service 
would pain be as a monitor unless the animal could respond by 
some perception of the situation? Bare or pure feeling of pain, 
