Editorial. 59 



on the motor character of attention, on the dynamogenic nature 

 of ideas, on ideomotor impulses, on tactile-kinaesthetic imag- 

 ery, on the emotions as vestiges of motor attitudes, on the 

 growth of voluntary movement, on the constructive and recon- 

 structive character of thought. Says Mr. Marshall: "We 

 are compelled to assume a unity of process in conscious life. 

 From this point of view, the distinctions between reflex and 

 instinctive activities and between habit and instinct are not fun- 

 damental. The sharp distinction between instinct and intelli- 

 gence implies denial of the unity of consciousness" {^Mind. Vol. 

 XI, No. 44). Professor Lloyd says: "Nothing in philosophy 

 is so much needed at the present time as the adjustment of the 

 science of abstract thought to the science of organic action, and 

 every little hint as to how this adjustment can be brought about 

 cannot but be at least a little help. The evolution of conscious- 

 ness must be almost meaningless until the simplest case of ac- 

 commodation as seen by the biologist is identified with the most 

 perfect case of abstract thought that the logician knows" i^Psy. 

 Kev., Vol. Ill, p. 426). And a recent writer has gone so far 

 as to define perception as "an attitude toward the object per- 

 ceived." He says: "Perception is an attitude toward an ob- 

 ject as well as a complex of sensations." "All that objects 

 mean to us is largely due to the sensations that flow backward 

 from the bodily reverberations they excite directly in us. Per- 

 ception is an attitude toward the objects perceived" (Bolton, 

 Biological View of Perception, Psy. Rev., Vol. IX, No. 6). 



How far these particular suggestions may prove fruitful in 

 bringing about the desired synthesis is a matter of relatively 

 little moment here. The important consideration is to note the 

 fact of this tendency in recent literature and to keep in touch 

 with the almost kaleidoscopic changes which are marking the 

 progress of the comparative method as employed in this field. 



The further investigations of animal reactions are carried, 

 the more difficult appears the problem of the distribution of 

 consciousness. But, as if to counterbalance this, the further 

 research in comparative psychology is carried, the more is the 

 conviction forced upon the investigator that the reactions of 



