F44 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology.- 



THE PROBLEM OF INSTINCT. 



In the whole field now awaiting the student of mental life 

 in animals, there is nothing of more cardinal interest and impor- 

 tance, both for animal psychology in itself and for general psych- 

 ology, than the group of problems centering about the develop- 

 ment of the conative life. And of these problems none promise 

 results so significant in themselves or so generally illuminative 

 of the mechanism of mind, as the problem of instinct. The 

 question of the origin of instincts ranks as a classic. Many 

 prominent naturalists and psychologists have taken a distinctly 

 anti-evolutional view of the matter, claiming intelligence and 

 volition as the source of instincts. They make a good case ; 

 at least there are facts of introspection which point unmistaka- 

 bly in this direction. On the other hand, the facts at our com- 

 mand point to an evolution of mental processes as well as of 

 physical structure. Instinct is clearly the conative life of lower 

 forms. They seem to have no other conative life. Higher 

 forms have both instinctive and intelligent conation. But it is 

 still an open question whether the instinct is the result of the 

 automatization of volitional processes, or whether it is the un- 

 conscious reaction which has been selected by the environment 

 and is thus the precursor which prepares the way for volition. 



The adaptation to the environment, through complex and 

 yet very fundamental instincts, as well as the fact of habit for- 

 mation in the individual life, make for the view that c/iotcc is a 

 factor in the formation of instinct. On the other hand, the gen- 

 eral order of evolution and development would place the simple, 

 the instinct, before the more complicated volition. Volitions 

 may be comparatively simple and instincts may be quite com- 

 plex. But the general plan of the instinct marks it as an earlier 

 form than the volition. We certainly have the indubitable evidence 

 of introspection for this order in ontogenesis. And we see the 

 same order in the mental development of the child. The same is 

 true in the phylogenetic series; but the further we go from a ner- 



