xvi Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



aspect of certain transformations of energy in the brain or other organ of con- 

 trol. . . . As Prof. James has said: "If a brief definition of ideal or moral 

 action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appear- 

 ances then this : "7? is action in the line of greatest resistance". How comes 

 it to appear to be action in the line of greatest resistance? Because of the 

 sense of effort which is associated with the\ final decision. Now this sense 

 of effort most markedly accompanies the newest and most difficult activities; 

 it is distinctively associated with the higher control-centres. Whatever 

 be the psychology of effort, its association with the higher control is a 

 fact of common experience. Suppose that we are drawn towards some 

 natural but immoral action by our lower instinctive impulses; but that we 

 resist the action by a resolute act of will, in obedience to the prompting 

 of a moral ideal. It is the latter and not the former, the ideal moti\e, not 

 the natural propensity, that is a matter of our control centres. IVe identify 

 ourselves rather with the action of our control centres than with oiir laiver animal 

 instincts, and say that we prevail over the instinctive propensity. This 

 association of the idea of self with the higher and most individual control- 

 centres, as compared with the lower instinctive propensities, is'the basis 

 of a rational doctrine of free-will. These higher impulses of the individual 

 control-centres we regard as essentially our own, we regard as voluntary ; 

 and we associate with them the motor feelings of effort which accompany 

 the newest, most difficult, most individual activies. A rational doctrine 

 of free-will (which may be held by the most rigid determinist) asserts that 

 the acts we call voluntary are essentially our own, the outcome of the play 

 of our own control-centres ; and that, being ours, we are responsible for 

 them. . . . All that I wish to insist upon is that the external occur- 

 rences must be translated into consciousness ere they can become part ©f the 

 symbolic series. . . . It is with the object as part of the mental symbolism 

 that we are dealing in all cases of human preception and observation. 

 I have laid special stress upon the symbolic nature of perceptual 

 experience, because it is sometimes supposed that in psychogenesis we 

 have to try and explain two things: first, the relations of percepts to each 

 other and to concepts ; and, secondly, the relations of percepts to objects 

 perceived or external occasions of perception. If what has been urged 

 above is valid, these two things are so radically distinct and different that 

 we should not comprise them under one head, at least without a very 

 clearly distinguishing adjective. We may call psychogenesis within the 

 sphere of mental symbolism "positive psychogenesis," and reserve the term 



