xxx JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY. 
this has been stated in many metaphors and similes. We are all either 
asking the question ‘‘why the mind has a body” or why the body ever 
came to have a mind. But what we still lack is an analysis of the 
origin and meaning of the distinction—its genesis and its function. 
Why do we distinguish between brain and consciousness at all, if ulti- 
mately they are so intimately one? Just how is their difference related 
to their identity ? How did the distinction originally come to be set up, 
and what modifications has it undergone in the history of scientific 
thought ? 
(2) The Psychological and the Biological. The author's discus- 
sion of the terms ‘‘psychic” and ‘‘psychological” (Chap. I, §2) is a 
hint of such an analysis. In this section Professor BaLDwIN distin- 
guishes between the ‘‘pyschological” and the ‘‘psychic” as follows: 
‘By the psychological I mean the mental of any grade, wewed from 
the outside ; that is, viewed as a definite set or series of phenomena in 
a consciousness, recognized as facts and as ‘worth while’ as any other 
facts in nature.” ‘‘This occurrence of a psychological change in an 
animal is a fact in the same sense that the animal's process of digestion 
is’ (p. 4). ‘‘The discussion of the respective spheres of these two 
sciences turns upon a distinction of points of view. On the one hand 
the psychologist as such, and for his science, must aim at the recogni- 
tion only of the facts which are psychic or mental; that is, of such as 
are facts to the consciousness iz which they occur. ‘These alone are 
psychic, and these belong to individual psychology” (p. 5). ‘‘Psychol- 
ogy, when considered as the science of mind,—that is, looked at from 
the objective point of view,—takes cognizance of the ‘psychonomic’ ; 
but when considered as a subjective science, as interpreting its own 
data, it does not; but, on the contrary, it confines itself to the psy- 
chic” (p. 8). 
By way of criticism of this, the question at once arises whether 
there is any such thing as psychology ‘‘considered as a subjective 
science” ? Many other writers have been insisting that there is no 
‘individual psychology” in this sense; there is no science of the indi- 
vidual. From this point of view, the ‘‘psychologist as such’' is no 
scientist at all; the attempt to draw a distinction between two kinds of 
psychology in this sense proves suicidal. If the difference ‘‘turns upon 
a distinction of points of view,’’ then it does not turn upon a distinc- 
tion of contents; if it is a distinction of method only, then it is 
not a distinction of subject-matter. When we take up ‘‘the stand- 
point of the observer, that of the scientific man who _ essays 
to investigate some one else’s consciousness, or that of an animal, 
