XXXIV JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY. 
of an accurate psychological analysis. The main discussion under 
these heads is preceded by four chapters entitled respectively: ‘‘In- 
troductory Definitions and Explanations,” ‘‘The Physical Signs of the 
Presence of Mind,” ‘‘The Nervous Conditions of the Manifestation 
of Mind,” ‘‘General Features of Conscious Life.” The author then 
proceeds to discuss the three chief forms of Sensttiveness, viz: ‘‘Sen- 
sory Experience,” ‘‘Mental Imagery,” ‘‘The Feelings.” The aim 
here is to ‘‘make a summary statement of the principal kinds of states 
of consciousness that occur within the range of our psychological ex- 
perience,” considered especially with relation to the sorts of physical 
conditions upon which they depend. ocility is treated in five chap- 
ters. This is the study of the ‘‘relations that bind the consciousness 
of any moment to previous experience.” ‘The ‘‘General Law of Do- 
cility” is the law of habit which is traced through its various exempli- 
fications in ‘‘Perception and Action,” ‘‘Assimilation,” ‘‘Differentia- 
tion,” and ‘‘Imitation,” which introduces to us ‘‘The Social Aspect of 
the Higher Forms of Docility.” /ztiative is discussed in a single 
chapter entitled: ‘‘The Conditions of Mental Initiative.” This is 
followed by two concluding chapters: ‘‘Certain Varieties of Emotion- 
al and Intellectual Life,” ‘‘The Will or the Direction of Conduct.” 
In general standpoint this book may be regarded as a contribu- 
tion to what is coming to be called the functional point of view in 
psychology. This is seen in the insistence upon the integrity of ex- 
perience, in the valuable critique of the doctrine of conscious elements 
as employed by the structural psychologist, and in the use throughout 
of the biological conception of habit, and even of consciousness, as 
special developments within the life of the organism for the sake of 
enabling it to adjust itself in its changing environment. Probably the 
author did not have this last point so explicitly in his aim as might be 
inferred from the statement just made, but it is only the more signifi- 
cant if such is the case. Hints of it are scattered throughout the 
book without any more explicit statement being made than that em- 
bodied, for example, in the following sentences: ‘‘The central pro- 
cesses which our images accompany form themselves a part of our 
reaction to our environment, avd our more organized sertes of mental 
images actually form part of our conduct’ (p. 160).' ‘‘Thought is either 
action or nothing” (p. 351). Here is the gist of the functional point 
of view, that all the various forms of consciousness are special devel- 
opments zwéhzn action, and, therefore, special developments of action. 
1 Ttalics ours. 
