Literary Notices. XXXVil 
stage intermediate between the life of cognition and the life of will. 
From this point of view our cognitive consciousness first furnishes to 
us the facts. In terms of our feelings we estimate the va/ues of these 
facts for us. In view of these values our acfs are determined. ‘That 
this traditional view has a real significance cannot be questioned. But 
in the present exposition of the structure and laws of consciousness 
we are not at all closely following the lines of the traditional exposi- 
tion” (164). Now the reviewer ventures to suggest that this tradi- 
tional view, with one modification, stands more in line with the general 
method of treatment pursued in this book than does the exposition 
actually given. On another page (226), the author says that in ordi- 
nary association ‘‘ the perception is relatively instantaneous.” ‘‘ The 
present sense disturbance is at once associated with a consciousness 
due to already established motor habits” (225). This suggests the real 
significance of the traditional view—which holds that we first perceive 
something, then feel interested in it, and then act upon it—only the 
traditional view regards this as a conscious act of perception, whereas, 
in truth, this initial perceptive act is automatic, instinctive or habitual. 
It is a good illustration of one of those “attitudes” to which the 
author refers elsewhere. ‘The traditional view is true except that the 
cognition which comes first is not conscious or reflective but instinc- 
tive or intuitive. And the consciousness, which the author says ac- 
companys our acts, or takes place ‘‘ side by side with the tendencies 
to action” (164), from this point of view is rather developed within 
the action at the point where and because of the fact that this instinc- 
tive perceptive habit fails to meet the exigencies of some situation. 
Thus is evolved first an emotional consciousness and then within this, 
as we have already seen, an intellectual consciousness (in this case, 
conscious cognition) which defines and controls this emotion. From 
this standpoint feeling is just unanalyzed consciousness; it is total, 
vague, impulsive consciousness; hence the significance of the analysis 
of emotion into organic, kinaesthetic and dermal sensations. 
(5) Initiative, attention, apperception, self-activity, are all traced 
back to elemental tendencies, instincts or tropisms, operating ‘‘at times 
when the results are not immediately adaptive.” If the adaptation 
were perfectly smooth and unimpeded there would be no need for the 
evolution of such phenomena as attention and initiative. These are 
the product of, and are developed to meet the necessities of disadap- 
tation in experience. The orderly control of experience in attention 
and direction of experience in so-called self-activity are the result of a 
selection from among a great number of still unadaptive movements 
