xviii Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



"This, I trust, is evident to all who have followed the line of ar- 

 gument. The mind is one and indivisible. Part of it is seen by the 

 mental faculty or eye we call consciousness, just as part of our body is 

 open to our gaze. The rest is no less mind because beyond the range 

 of vision, any more than those parts of the body are not corporeal 

 which are outside the range of sight. Their existence can be easily 

 proved by other faculties, just as the unconscious mind can be proved 

 without the aid of consciousness. I say nothing of double conscious- 

 ness, as I cannot here speak of consciousness as being any other than 

 that with which we are familiar in our normal state. There may be 

 other consciousnesses ; for our purpose they are termed 'unconscious.' 



"The narrow range of the conscious mind, compared with the 

 wide field of the unconscious, has been also noted here." 



This epitome is sufficient to show a common fallacy which I try to 

 exemplify as follows : 



Any experience (I use this word in preference to the too special- 

 ized words sensation, emotion, because nothing is purely sensation, or 

 emotion, etc.), whether it appears prominent at the time of its occur- 

 rence or not, implies a certain attitude of the person which, like all atti- 

 tudes, is apt to recur. We know of biological organisms that what is 

 commonly called memory is fundamentally the likelihood of recurrence 

 of attitudes, with more or less definition. We know also that an atti- 

 tude may persist without our paying conscious attention to it. The ex- 

 istence of likelihood of recurrence, the possibility of using the partial 

 recurrence, is what we call memory, and it is not necessary to assume 

 with Herbart that a sort of permanent jumping-jack arrangement of 

 permanent ideas exists which is difficult to imagine psychically, and 

 impossible even with the ideas of "deposits" and vestiges" in the mor- 

 phological field. What is undeniable and sufficient is the existence of 

 a greater readiness for attitudes once actually experienced — a thing 

 totally different from an actual 'mind,' in the sense of mental activity, 

 but evidently what is commonly implied by the term "unconscious 

 mind." 



Let us replace Schofield's simile of the persistence of the parts of 

 the body which are not in sight, by one more in point for a functional 

 phenomenon. 



The work of a cobbler gives his hand a very definite shape which 

 makes it adapted to the work, and allows an experienced observer to 

 recognize promptly the occupation of the person. Yet, the adaptation, 

 the morphological attitude, would never be confused with the occupa- 

 tion itself, as a permanency of actual occupation, but merely as evi- 



