78 IICENSING AND Fl.FET Dl Vi:i.OPMI N 1 \t)\ l( V 



indeed, common pro|X"rtv is ropiigiKinl to ihc principles 

 of a market economy, and those that invoke the virtues ot 

 free enlerpnse shi>iild be the least satisfied with the tree- 

 for-ali of open fisheries. Alternatives to common property 

 are less obvious for fisheries than for some other 

 resources, like land or forests that can be easily parcelled 

 out, but I shall identity some later in this chapter. What- 

 ever their shortcomings, they cannot be regarded as 

 interterences with free enterpri.se in the fisheries. Nor, for 

 that matter, dcH.'s common property fit within cla.ssical 

 socialism, which implies centralized ownership and con- 

 trol by the state with no competitive exploitation by inde- 

 pendent fishermen. No more can be said for common 

 property on political grounds than on economic or con- 

 servation grounds. 



EVOLUTION OF FLEET DEVELOPMENT POLICY 



Having examined the early development of the Pacific 

 fisheries and fisheries policy, I am struck by the continu- 

 ity of the problem of overcapacity and the failure of 

 policy-makers to learn the lessons of history. The brief 

 sketch that follows is intended to emphasize the need for 

 fundamental fx)licy changes to avoid further repetition of 

 past mistakes. 



Early Attempts to Control Fleet Expansion 



The need to control the expansion of fishing fleets in 

 Canada's Pacific fisheries has been recognized by astute 

 observers for nearly a century. In the 1880s, anxieties 

 about overexploitation of salmon on the Fraser River 

 were sharpened by the apparent depletion of stocks in the 

 Columbia and Sacramento Rivers to the south. As early 

 as 1887 a fisheries official on the Fraser River opined that 

 "it is about time that some limit . . .be placed on the num- 

 ber of nets allowed on this river. . . ."' 



Two years later, in 1889, the federal government lim- 

 ited the number of licences for fishing boats on the Fraser 

 to 500. Three hundred and fifty of these were distributed 

 among the canneries according to their canning capacity. 

 The only way they could obtain more licences was to 

 expand capacity, and as the fishery became more 

 profitable, the canneries, predictably, did just that. New 

 canneries were built as well, the number increasing from 

 12 to 18 within 3 years. The vessel limitation scheme 

 therefore broke down and was abandoned in 1892. By the 

 following year, the number of licences had doubled to 

 more than a thousand. 



A second experiment was attempted on the north 

 coast, where nearly all the fleet was owned by canneries. 

 By 1907 the Commissioner of Fisheries for British 

 Columbia had become alarmed at the increasing number 

 of boats and, fearing a repetition of the Fraser River 

 experience, proposed that "no additional canneries 



should be permitted In be constructed iti the North, ami 

 that a limit be placed upon the number of boats which 

 the existing canneries should be permitted to operate."'' A 

 limit was instituted the following year. Under the allot- 

 ments. 850 boats were allowed to fish the Skeena; and 

 750, Rivers Inlet. Boats were allocated among the can- 

 neries through private negotiations among them. Inevit- 

 able disagreements arose, which threatened to cause the 

 arrangements to collapse. So in 1910 the provincial gov- 

 ernment took control, determined to enforce a "solution 

 of a problem which has wrecked many of the salmon 

 fisheries of the Pacific Coast and has constantly threat- 

 ened all."' 



But again, high profits in fishing led to the demise of 

 the regulatory system. As the value of salmon escalated 

 during the First World War, the government acceded to 

 pressures to issue licences to new canneries. And, under 

 pressure to provide job opportunities for returning sol- 

 diers at the war's end, the federal government lifted all 

 restrictions on cannery licences in 1917. 



The established canneries objected strongly to the 

 return of unlimited access; the government responded by 

 appointing a royal commission (the Evans Commission) 

 to investigate the problems of the salmon industry. The 

 commission's report reveals a remarkably perceptive 

 understanding of the need for controls. 



... it seems to us equally clear that all condi- 

 tions surrounding the industry should as far 

 as possible be stabilized and the excessive use 

 of capital and labour obviated or 

 prevented. . . . The solution of this problem 

 would not seem to be found in encouraging 

 or permitting the employment of more capital 

 or more labour than can efficiently perform 

 the work. ... If the cost of production 

 becomes too great all hope of advantage to 

 the public as consumers will disappear.* 



The commission therefore recommended limiting the 

 industry and collecting the excess profits that would 

 result from price increases. These recommendations were 

 not adopted, however. 



The fisheries continued to expand, and several decades 

 later, in 1958, Dr. Sol. Sinclair was appointed to investi- 

 gate the salmon and halibut fisheries. By that time the 

 general theoi^ of why common-property fisheries inevi- 

 tably overexpand was better understood. Sinclair pro- 

 posed a system of restricted vessel licences and levies on 

 the catch to dampen incentives to overinvest.' These rec- 

 ommendations were vigorously debated and provided the 

 basis for the licence limitation plan (the Davis Plan) 

 introduced for the salmon fishery a decade later. 



