>)0 



•\ I KAMI WOKK lOR (■t)\l\ll K( I \l I l( INSINCI 



ii) Bids for liiriKfs sIhhiUI s|x\ify a siiiulo year to 

 In.' aiillM>ri/«.~il l)> iIh- Uci'ikv (^illiH'l or st'liio lor 

 roi>-lHTriii^; Killiiii, si-iiM- or troll lor saliiMtii) 

 uikI. hIktc a|){)licahic. a inirticiilar hhk\ 



ili) F\ivpt for mt^lR-rrin^ t^illiH't lici'iK'i>s, bids 

 slHitiU! Ik- ixpri-vstnl in dolLirs (kt ton of vt-ssi'l 

 capacity applied for, to be- paid each vc;ir during 

 tlK' tonii of the licence. Bids for roe-licrrinf; 

 ^iJInet licences shoiiid simply authorise tlic use of 

 one vessel witlH)iit refereiKe to its size. 



14. For new quota licentx's — 



i) The licence slwuld authorize the harvest of a 

 specitie<l quantity of the relevant species in the 

 particular zone, each year for the temi of the 

 licence. 



ii) Bids should be expressed in dollars per unit of 

 qiM)ta. to be paid each year during the term of the 

 licence. 



ii!) Subject to the limits on control recommendeil 

 later in this chapter, bidders should be free to bid 

 for any quantity of quota they wish following the 

 transitional period. 



15. Mariculture leases should be allocated and periodi- 

 cally reallocated according to wmpetitive bidding pro- 

 cedures unless the land area that forms the geographi- 

 cal base for the tenure is controlled by the applicant 

 and thus is not open to management by anyone else. 



The 10-year quota licences should be used to systemat- 

 ically allocate the total allowable catch of quota fisheries, 

 to the extent that allowable catches are predictable over 

 time. However, there should also be the means for allo- 

 cating additional quantities offish that become available 

 temporarily as a result of natural phenomena or past 

 underutilization. 



16. The Department should be authorized to issue short- 

 term quota permits for allocating temporarily harvest- 

 able surpluses in quota fisheries. 



Where feasible, quota permits should be allocated 

 according to competitive bidding, but in any event the 

 permit holder should be required to pay royalties at rates 

 recommended later in this chapter. 



Finally, initial allocations of quotas may sometimes 

 exceed the allowable catch in a fishery, or because of 

 natural phenomena the abundance of a stock may 

 decline. The Department must be able to reduce quota 

 allocations in these circumstances. 



17. The Department should have the authority to reduce 

 quotas pro rata when necessary to reconcile them with 

 the total allowable catch in a fishery. 



Under llicsc proposals, onc-tciilli ot llic (.Icsircd total 

 licences in each fishery will be issued by competition each 

 year, one year bctorc their terms begin so that successful 

 and unsuccessful biildcrs alike can plan accordingly, if, 

 as time goes on, the Department finds that the outstand- 

 ing licences are either excessive or insufficient, it should 

 alter appropriately the quantities of new licences issued, 

 spreading the adjustment over the years. 



Several significant advantages flow from the proposed 

 licensing arrangements. First, existing fishermen will 

 enjoy greater security and certainty about their fi.shing 

 privileges under long-term licences. Allocating new 

 licences one year in advance of the beginning of their 

 term will further facilitate advanced planning. Second, 

 after a transitional period, newcomers will be able to 

 enter the fisheries by dealing directly with the govern- 

 ment instead of having to purchase a licence from some- 

 one else. Third, the Department will have unprecedented 

 opportunities to adjust access to the fisheries continu- 

 ously as needs change. Fourth, allocations through com- 

 petitive bidding is an objective means for determining 

 who will have access to scarce and valuable public 

 resources and will ensure that, through time, licences are 

 exercised by those who can make the best use of them. 

 All the successful bidders in each competition will pay 

 the same amount per unit for their fishing privileges. Fur- 

 thermore, through competitive bidding, some of the sur- 

 plus value generated in a rationalized fishery will be 

 returned to the public treasury instead of being absorbed 

 into licence values and appropriated by the original licen- 

 sees as they have been in the past. 



As recommended in Chapters 9 and 10, the proposed 

 bidding procedures will not apply to initial allocations to 

 established licensees, since they will be grandfathered 

 into the new licensing system, and only they will be eligi- 

 ble to compete for new licences during the transitional 

 period. 



Landings Requirements 



Most of the existing licences are automatically renew- 

 able so long as the licensee has landed fish in the preced- 

 ing year or two. The provisions vary considerably with- 

 out apparent logic: most salmon licences qualify for 

 renewal if the vessel has recorded as little as one fish 

 landed during the previous two years; while a residual 

 species ("C") licence holder, who fishes much less valu- 

 able stocks, must show at least $500 in landings at least 

 every other licence year. 



These conditions are directed against idle licence hold- 

 ers, but their efl^ect is mainly to induce all licensees to fish 

 in order to protect their rights. In addition, such provi- 

 sions encourage false landings reports in order to main- 

 tain fishing privileges when they are not being exercised. 

 Thus, whenever fishing licences are valuable or even 



