LICENSING THE SMALLER CO\fMERCIAL FISHERIES 137 



not unrelated to its advanced form of licensing, which 

 has quickly progressed from uncontrolled access, to 

 limited-entry licensing, to the quota licence system that 

 applies today. 



Abalone are highly valued shellfish that are widely 

 dispersed along the Pacific coast of North and South 

 America. They are harvested mainly by divers operating 

 from vessels. 



The abalone ("E") licence was introduced in 1977 to 

 restrict entry into a fishery that had developed suddenly, 

 become overcrowded and was depleting the resource. 

 Licences were issued at a fee of $200 to vessel operators 

 who had landed more than $2,000 worth of abalone and 

 earned more than half their fishing income from abalone 

 in either of the two preceding years. After appeals were 

 considered, 26 fishermen qualified for licences. 



Initially, licences did not specify the catch that the 

 holders were permitted to take, with predictable results in 

 an increasingly valuable fishery regulated with open- 

 ended fishing privileges. In the first two years the total 

 catch exceeded a million pounds, well in excess of the 

 sustainable yield. Some larger enterprises had landed 

 more than 100 thousand pounds each. As the virgin 

 stocks were run down, the catch had to be substantially 

 reduced. In 1979 the coastwide allowable catch was fixed 

 at 500 thousand pounds. The next year it was halved 

 again to 250 thousand pounds. This current level may be 

 roughly consistent with the sustainable yield. 



The excessive fleet and the need to reduce the catch 

 resulted in new measures to control operations. In 1979 

 one half of the 500 thou.sand pound allowable catch was 

 exploited competitively in the early part of the year; the 

 remainder was then divided equally to provide a catch 

 quota to each licensed fisherman. Since 1980, the entire 

 catch has been divided in this manner, providing individ- 

 ual quotas of 10,000 pounds in 1980 and of 8,000 in 1981 

 for each of the 26 abalone licensees. 



The licence is issued to persons rather than vessels, but 

 the licensee must designate the vessel he will use; and he 

 must own a majority interest in the designated vessel. 

 Only one licence is available to each qualifying fisher- 

 man, so that each quota is intended to be taken with a 

 diff'erent vessel. 



The basic structure of the abalone licence system is 

 excellent. Since the licence is issued to persons and con- 

 veys the right to take a specified catch, it provides a direct 

 mechanism for regulating the total allowable catch. Fish- 

 ing can take place all year round, and restrictions on 

 vessels and gear are minimal. Most importantly, this sys- 

 tem has eliminated incentives for vesselowners to com- 

 petitively expand their fishing capacity beyond that 

 required to effectively take their quotas. 



Nevertheless, the licensing system can be improved 

 significantly. Some improvements can be made by simply 

 removing certain unnecessary restrictions on licence 

 holders. If the requirement that each licensee own a ves- 

 sel and use it to catch his quota were strictly applied, this 

 would force 26 vessels to operate in this fishery each year. 

 This serves no useful conservation purpose and is eco- 

 nomically wasteful, especially since the quotas are so 

 small. Moreover, I see no justification for a licensing pol- 

 icy that requires fishermen to own the vessels they use in 

 a fishery. 



As the quotas have been reduced, some individual 

 operations have been forced well below an economically 

 efficient size. This has put a heavy strain on the system, 

 and legal techniques have been found to circumvent the 

 restnction that each quota must be exercised from a sepa- 

 rate vessel. To solve this serious problem I recommended 

 in my Preliminary Report, among other things, that these 

 quotas be transferable, and that licensees be permitted to 

 divide and combine them. Further, I proposed that the 

 rule requiring licensees to own the vessels they use to fish 

 for abalone be abolished. Since then the Minister has 

 announced his intention to remove the restrictions on 

 transfers of quotas. At the time of writing, no such 

 changes have been implemented, however. 



In order to enable this fishery to develop further, more 

 fundamental changes should be made. The considerable 

 potential for abalone production can best be realized 

 under a system of management and utilization based on 

 mariculture leases. The stocks are immobile and respond 

 well to enhancement by techniques that are already well 

 established, as I explain in the following chapter. Adopt- 

 ing a lease system would be a natural progression in the 

 evolution of management for this fishery, for production 

 from both wild and cultured stocks. 



Mariculture leases would direct private incentives to 

 develop opportunities for an expanded abalone fishery; 

 they would improve the geographical pattern of harvest- 

 mg; they would enable licensees to harvest the allowable 

 catch without interfering with each other or competitively 

 depleting certain areas; and they would shift much of the 

 regulator}.' and administrative responsibilities from the 

 Department to fishing enterprises. 



Approximately two dozen abalone fishermen are now 

 licensed, all of whom are experienced in the fishery and 

 nearly all of whom belong to the recently organized West 

 Coast Abalone Harvesters Association. These fishermen 

 have now had four years of experience with the quota 

 licensing system and have seen its benefits in eliminating 

 tendencies to expand fishing capacity redundantly. 

 Indeed, this fishery has recently shown a most untypical 

 trend toward consolidation and fleet reduction through 

 market processes and voluntary transactions, in spite of 

 obstacles imposed by the government. 



