IS* INDIANS IN mi COMMI R{ I \l IISIIIKIIS 



Pacitic tishcrics. I he program was liiiKlcd h\ the IX'part- 

 mcnt ol Indian and Northern Atlairs and administered 

 by the [X'partnient ol fisheries and CXeans through the 

 Indian Fishermen's IX-velopment Board on which Indi- 

 ans as well as the two government departments were 

 represented. Scmie $16.3 million had been expended by 

 197*) when the program ended, about halt in grants and 

 halt' in loans. Until the end of 197K the recovery on loan 

 payments was an impressive 91 percent; since then the 

 rate has fallen as a result of p<.x)r returns from fishing. 



The program had three primary objectives: 



i) To arrest the decline in the number of Indian vessels 

 and, if possible, to reverse it; 



ii) To improve the earnings of Indian vessels so they 

 equalled the average of the rest of the fleet; and 



ill) To improve the versatility and mobility of the Indian 

 fleet to the level of the rest of the fleet. 



Secondary objectives included assisting Indians who 

 operated rental vessels to become owners, helping young 

 Indians to enter the fishing industry, maintaining a ton- 

 nage bank to assist Indians with licences, improving 

 training and fishing skills, and assisting in developing 

 shore facilities on reserve lands for fishing vessels. 



Coupled with the special licensing provisions for Indi- 

 ans, the program achieved a good measure of success in 

 terms of its main objectives. First, while the portion of 

 the salmon fleet owned and rented by Indians had 

 declined to 15 percent by 1969, by 1977 it had increased 

 slightly to 16 percent. The increase was entirely in 

 Indian-owned seine vessels, which increased by nearly 60 

 percent to 27 percent of the total seine fleet. Indian 

 gjllnetters and trollers declined at about the same rate as 

 non-Indian vessels. 



Second, the average gross earnings of Indian vessels 

 increased from a low of 6 1 percent of the average for the 

 salmon fleet as a whole in 1967 to a high of 109 percent in 

 1973, and averaged 84 percent during the last five years 

 of the program. The average gross earnings of the vessels 

 that were assisted under the program were almost half 

 again as high as the average earnings of all Indian vessels 

 over the program period. The value of landings by Indian 

 vessels in species other than salmon (mostly herring) 

 increased from less than two percent of the total catch in 

 1969 to more than nine percent in 1977. 



Third, the versatility and mobility of Indian vessels was 

 improved. The total tormage of Indian vessels increased 

 by 33 percent, more than double the rate for the fleet as a 

 whole, and their average value increased from 67 to 87 

 percent of the average for the whole fleet. The vessels that 

 were assisted by the program were valued 31 percent 

 above the average for all vessels.' 



Assistance was extended to 59 Indians to purchase 

 rental vessels, and 52 operators of rental boats received 

 aid to purchase gear and equipment. liighty-five grants 

 were made to bring older vessels to the minimum stand- 

 ards required for licensing. 



The program was less successful in encouraging 

 younger Indians to enter the fishery; many were deterred 

 by the 12.5 percent minimum down payment (20 percent 

 prior to 1974) required to purchase a vessel. The attempt 

 to promote construction of shore facilities in Indian com- 

 munities to increa.se efl^ciency of fishing operations also 

 met with little success. 



The main criticism of the Indian Fishermen's Assist- 

 ance Program was that it benefited primarily those Indi- 

 ans who were already well-established and successful 

 fishermen. It probably also increased the disparity of 

 earnings across the Indian fleet. Furthermore, by provid- 

 ing financial assistance, it contributed to the problem of 

 overcapitalization and excess capacity in the fleet, esf)e- 

 cially in the seine sector. However, in the context of the 

 restrictive licensing program described in Chapter 9, this 

 latter result must be regarded as almost inevitable if the 

 competitive position of Indian fishermen were to be 

 improved. 



The Indian Fishermen's Emergency Assistance Program 



In spite of the substantial assistance provided under 

 the Indian Fishermen's Assistance Program and the spe- 

 cial licensing arrangements for Indians, the number of 

 Indian salmon vessels began to decline sharply after 

 1977. Between 1977 and 1980, the Indian-owned fleet 

 dropped by some 100 vessels.'" These vessels fell into two 

 groups: better vessels (including several that had 

 benefited under the Indian Fishermen's Assistance Pro- 

 gram) that were sold to non-Indians in order to reap the 

 capital gains from inflated licence values in the boom 

 years of 1977 and 1978; and submarginal vessels that 

 survived the prosperous years but failed in the poor years 

 that followed. 



Indians and the Department of Indian and Northern 

 Aff"airs were afraid that the conspicuously poor year of 

 1980 and the bleak prospects for 1981 would accelerate 

 the displacement of Indians. As a result, a stop-gap emer- 

 gency program (the Indian Fishermen's Emergency 

 Assistance Program) was implemented late in 1980. Its 

 purpose was to assist with debt payments, repairs, equip- 

 ment and start-up costs of Indians threatened with bank- 

 ruptcy." This program was funded by the Department of 

 Indian and Northern Affairs and administered by two 

 Indian-controlled boards: one controlled by the Native 

 Brotherhood of British Columbia; the other, by the 13 

 bands of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. It provided 

 for $2 million in grants, another $2 million in loan 

 guarantees and $200 thousand in direct loans. At the time 



