IS N I KON USUI RIIS 



issucii hv scp;iralc governments, hut Ktwcen two tcdcral 

 Nialiitev .uliiniiiNtcrcil b\ separate agencies i>l the same 

 gmernment. So far, impasses have been avoided and the 

 Department of Fisheries and Oceans has concentrated, 

 with mixed success, on having ci>nditions attached lo 

 water hcences to mitigate damage to hsh habitat. But the 

 ptnential tor conflict remains, and is heightened by the 

 prospect of hydroelectric de\elopments and other major 

 projects such as the proposed Alaska Highway natural 

 gas pipeline. 



Ih'purtnwiu of the t'm iroiwicnt The Environmental 

 Protection Service of the I^epartment of the Environment 

 conducts water quality studies and participates in design- 

 ing guidelines for water u.se by placer mining operations 

 and municipalities. It also has responsibility, jointly with 

 the [X'partment of Fisheries and Oceans, for administer- 

 ing the deleterious substance .section (section 33) of the 

 Fisheries .Act. The service is represented on the Yukon 

 Territory Water Board, but it has been criticized for fail- 

 ing to aggressively advance fisheries values in the board's 

 deliberations. 



Pnyect Approval Arrangements 



To coordinate their separate interests in new industrial 

 developments and other projects in the territory, the fed- 

 eral agencies have established an initial environmental 

 evaluation procedure to provide interagency review of a 

 wide range of projects. This is an entirely administrative 

 process without statutory authority, but it provides an 

 avenue for the Department to bring considerations offish 

 habitat to bear on development plans. 



This process is initiated by the other resource agencies, 

 described above, when they receive a development pro- 

 posal. It tends to be dominated by the large staff and 

 resources of the Department of Indian and Northern 

 Affairs. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, with 

 its meagre resources, is typically in a position of reacting 

 defensively rather than participating fully in project plan- 

 ning. In addition, the Department has been reluctant to 

 acknowledge the legitimacy of the kind of trade-offs 

 implied by integrated resource management and plan- 

 ning (described in Chapter 3). This is due in part to the 

 uncompromising wording of the Fishenes Act, which the 

 Department is required to administer (see Chapter 3). In 

 addition, it has not had the information about fish 

 resources, their habitats and capabilities required to 

 engage in effective planning, or the manpower and facili- 

 ties needed to monitor and enforce habitat protection 

 measures. 



Toward Improved Habitat Management 



The present provisions for protecting and managing 

 fish habitat in Yukon are inadequate for the task. The 



division of responsibilities among governniciiial agencies 

 needs to be ratioiiali/cd, their rcsp>ective authorities must 

 be clarified and arrangements tor planning and project 

 approvals need to be more systematic and effective. 



A basic requirement is to clarity the authority of fed- 

 eral agencies involved in habitat protection. In Chapter 3 

 I propo.sed that the overiapping responsibilities of the 

 Departments of the Environment and Fisheries and 

 Oceans be resolved by a.ssigning to the latter full respon- 

 sibility for administering the habitat protection provi- 

 sions of the Fisheries Act in the Pacific region, including 

 Yukon. This will alleviate one source of uncertainty and 

 duplication. 



In Chapter 3 f made specific recommendations con- 

 cerning the Department's commitment to integrated 

 resource use planning and management, and techniques 

 for its more effective involvement in this program. My 

 proposals there for the Department's participation in 

 referral arrangements and its authority to approve devel- 

 opments apply equally to Yukon. If Departmental 

 approvals of hydroelectric power facilities, placer mining 

 operations and similar activities were incorporated into 

 water licences, the potential conflict between the Fisher- 

 ies Act and the Northern Inland Waters Act would be 

 resolved. 



Compensation arrangements for damaged habitat were 

 also recorrunended in Chapter 3, but the need for these in 

 Yukon is far less acute because the federal government 

 alone owns the natural resources there and administers 

 fisheries. With only one government directly involved, 

 the line of political accountability is much clearer than 

 for British Columbia and resource use conflicts can be 

 reconciled among federal agencies. Habitat protection in 

 Yukon should focus on mitigating damage; any arrange- 

 ments for compensation can be settled individually for 

 each project where the federal government considers 

 them warranted. Thus, in Yukon emphasis should be 

 placed on the administrative procedures adopted by fed- 

 eral agencies in assessing proposed developments. 



Second, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' lack 

 of representation on the Yukon Territory Water Board is 

 anomalous in view of the importance for fisheries man- 

 agement of the board's decisions. This is apparently a 

 legacy of the time when fisheries administration was part 

 of the federal Department of the Environment and hence 

 was represented by the member appointed from that 

 agency. In view of the legislative requirement that mem- 

 bership of the board must include representatives of fed- 

 eral departments that are most directly concerned with 

 managing water resources in the territory, and my pro- 

 posals that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans 

 assume more responsibility for water quality, I recom- 

 mend — 



