64 C. U. ARIENS KAPPERS 



In mental life the associations in the primary many-in-oneness 

 bring about a secondary many-in-oneness during personal life, 

 which is much less coherent than the primary. Consciousness 

 in consequence of the factor of attention, which always plays a 

 part in it, can never envisage any but units, whether in a spatial 

 sense, such as concrete objects, or abstract units, units in a spirit- 

 ual sense, such as laws. The many-in-oneness of the ego in its 

 environment, however, is beyond the scope of attentive, scientific 

 consideration, its presence is realized, experienced. Attention 

 operates in it, analyzes it, but does not survey it. 



It seems hardly necessary to say that the ideas expressed here 

 are in the main very much in harmony with Aristotle's doctrine 

 concerning the 'psyche' as a general principle of life, which under- 

 lies both the rational functions and instinctive actions and phe- 

 nomena of growth, a conception also defended by Driesch. That 

 also between these three functions there are considerable differ- 

 ences needs no further explanation. 



These differences are even so considerable and so evident that 

 they have prevented the greater part of students from seeing the 

 underlying common principles, which, however, by poets are 

 often emphasized (Maeterlinck, for instance, in his 'Intelligence 

 des fleurs') and also by philosophers like Schelling. 



I will not end without a 'plaidoyer" in favor of psychological 

 studies for biological students. It has often appeared to me that 

 this is of great value. Immediate knowledge and the results of 

 introspection must complete our study of the phenomena. Sev- 

 eral properties of life — among which the most important — can 

 only be known immediately, not or mainly a posteriori from the 

 study of phenomena. 



