Carus, The Seat of Consciousness. 181 



claims that some psychological states possess no physiological 

 concomitants. Any psychologist who, with a critical sense of 

 experimental science applies the old principle of introspection, 

 often erroneously represented as utterly antiquated, will find that 

 consciousness is never a simple feeling but a very complex 

 and almost kaleidoscopic state of many feelings in co-ordination; 

 and there are feelings — say for instance, a pain of a certain 

 intensity — which are and remain conscious in the absence of 

 stronger feelings, but can be dimmed or crowded out of the 

 range of conscious perception as soon as stronger pains 

 arise or at the appearance of some important thought strong 

 enough to absorb our entire attention. As soon as the interest 

 of the stronger feeling disappears the less intense feeling will 

 rise again into the appperception of consciousness. 



Consciousness being produced by a co-ordination of feelings 

 we must expect that consciousness originates in an organ of 

 co-ordination. It must be like a central telephone office in 

 which all messages that require special attention are received. 

 Anything that happens outside of this central station remains 

 unknown to that part of ourselves which we can call our con- 

 scious personality or ego. Here we keep on file, as it were, all 

 the most important events that were transacted at the main 

 office, our recollections and old experiences. Here during the 

 waking state the newest reports of sense-information come in ; 

 all of the sense-images of sight or sound, of smell or taste, of 

 temperature or tactual resistance are living feelings which by 

 irritating the nervous structures to which they are most akin 

 rouse a number of old memories. This meeting of new sensa- 

 tions with old recollections produces that peculiar state of 

 awareness and distinct apperception which we call conscious- 

 ness. 



Sleep is simply a closing of the central office where the in- 

 coming irritations meet the memories of former experiences. 

 If we take a nap the co-ordination of feelings is reduced. In a 

 light slumber sense-impressions are no longer perceived, others 

 become indistinct and fail to rouse the recollections to which 

 they properly belong. Sentiency, however, may continue. In 



