224 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



here. It is easy to destroy the integrity of a vast number of 

 functions by injury to the striatum but this is far from proving 

 that these functions are coordinated there. The results of com- 

 parative and embryological research do not, it is true, so 

 strongly differentiate the striatum from the rest of the cerebrum 

 as would be expected from its appearance of isolation in man. 

 In fact the striatum as such may be to all appearance absent in 

 animals with well-developed cortex. We have offered evidence 

 that this is originally a proliferating centre from which cortical 

 elements are derived. It is certain at least that the anatom- 

 ical discreteness of the striatum in man is no true indication of 

 independence of function. Anyone who has studied the stri- 

 atum in thin sections will I think be impressed with the paucity 

 of elements and their apparent latent character. 



As compared with the ruber or niger the striata are rela- 

 tively structureless. 



Thus upon the ground chosen by Dr. Carus we should not 

 incline to recognize the striata as seats of consciousness. 



However, there are other considerations which are of 

 greater moment. Upon a dynamic theory of consciousness 

 such as is suggested by Dr. Carus, if we correctly understand 

 him, there is no occasion for a special organ. The fact of coor- 

 dination is the fact of consciousness. If the myriads of cortical 

 cells are so interrelated that their reactions mutually modify 

 each other that is all that is required. No cells for the registry 

 of the process or special devices for correlating what is already 

 coordinated assist in any way. A physical organ for conscious- 

 ness, in a certain sense, would be found in the whole neuropi- 

 lem or meshwork of the cortex with the cells supplying it. If 

 it were possible for the same sorts of interactions to be set up 

 in the cord we see no reason for, denying consciousness to that 

 region. However, we should be forced to go a step farther. 

 Consciousness has a certain unity the recognition of which forces 

 Dr. Carus and all who seek an anatomical seat of consciousness 

 to require a solidarity of function — a simplicity in structure. 

 This is afforded by considering the whole coordinated cortical 

 system as a functional unit or rather conceiving the power of 



