226 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



ployed most consistently as it seems to me as a name for such 

 elements of consciousness as contain an explicit or implicate 

 value to the subject ; a sensation, on the other hand, is such an 

 element lacking the subjective reference or implication. The 

 finger resting on a rough surface affords a sensation of rough- 

 ness referred to the object, but a feeling of disagreeableness or 

 pain referred to self. Intelligence for us is the total product of 

 the conscious activities so far as they involve recognition and 

 construction of the cortical processes. But we have said per- 

 haps more than enough. With what we conceive to be Dr. 

 Carus' fundamental idea that consciousness is dynamic we are 

 glad to agree but hesitate to accept either his terminology or 

 the neurological suggestions embodied in the article and in his 

 work on the soul. Nevertheless if some one should be incited 

 to a special minute study of the striata with direct reference to 

 the problem of cellular structure and coordination, a valuable re- 

 sult will have been reached. 



