clxxxvi Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



Psychology and the natural sciences is simply "the dependence of 

 these experiences upon living individuals." 



It is quite erroneous to speak of the experiences of Psychology 

 as essentially inductive. As a matter ot fact, objectivization is pecu- 

 liar to Psychology, as thought or feeling are. 



Experimental Psychology avoids regarding the individual as a 

 spiritual entity or an aggregate of faculties. The author does not find it 

 necessary to declare for either the monistic or dualistic interpretation 

 of the observed coincidence between psychical and physical phenom- 

 ena but is satisfied with a statement of the parallelism. 



Psychology is divided, as by Wundt, into a treatment of (i) the 

 elements of consciousness, (2) the combination of these elements, (3) 

 the condition or state of consciousness. Under simple elements of 

 consciousness two classes are made to accommodate (1) the experi- 

 ences which are definitely related to certain peripheral and perhaps 

 also central stimuli, sensations, and (2) those which are not thus 

 definitely associated with any bodily organs, Feelings. We think this 

 distinction is largely a statement of ignorance, for it is most probable 

 that the feelings are always intimately associated with characteristic 

 forms of nervous agitation, though there may be no specific " centres " 

 for the several modalities. 



A brief review of the literature closes the introduction. 



The first part is devoted to the Elements of Consciousness, be- 

 ginning with the analysis of sensations. The properties attributable 

 to sensations are equality, intensity, duration and extension though, 

 of course, all need not be present in every sensation. The most im- 

 portant determinant in the analysis of sensations is the discriminating 

 faculty or sensitiveness to differences. 



The general conditions of sensation and discrimination are treated 

 in fatiguing detail, attention, practice and fatigue are rubriced and 

 sub-headed in true German style. The discussion of measurement of 

 sensation is excellent as the subject is important. 



Sensations are inherently incapable of measurement. Discrimi- 

 nation, on the other hand, supplies the lack. Like and unlike, pres- 

 ent and absent are the two sets of judgments applicable. The state- 

 ments " like " and " absent" are unambiguous, always having a con- 

 stant value, but the other two are subject to great uncertainties. The 

 amount of variation of stimulus with invariable sensation is a recip- 

 rocal measure of the discrimination. 



The following abbreviations are suggested and used throughout 

 the book, most of them already in use. The stimulus = r; difference 



