12 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



should be presented to consciousness. We cannot attend to a 

 sensation not already a content of sense nor to an unreproduced 

 reproduction. We can not manufacture a sensation to "attend 

 to," but can we perhaps reproduce a vestige not in conscious- 

 ness ? It is evidently absurd. In the case of the various sense 

 contents we have seen that some have special attributes of in- 

 tensity or special reinforcing collaterals to adapt them to affect the 

 higher centres. May it not be true that the vestiges of con- 

 scious processes (memory material) may have similar differential 

 powers and special vehicles ? The familiar fact that repetition 

 facilitates reproduction shows that these vestiges are capable of 

 being differentiated in their power of appeal to consciousness. 

 Now experimentally let us undertake to recall the name of the 

 man we met yesterday. " Think " as I may, no trace appears. 

 I wrinkle the brow and strain all sorts of antagonistic muscles 

 and set up a great sense of effort in the attempt to induce cere- 

 bral innervation, in fact, I do succeed in forcing an unusual sup- 

 ply of blood into the head and quickening the play of images 

 but none of them is the right one. Try a new tack ! The pre- 

 sentations originally responsible for all the disturbance were of 

 — a person — a man — met yesterday — and we have exhausted 

 the associational images called up by " man " — "name" — 

 "Jones, Jenkins, Jaynes, etc." let us dismiss them and see 

 what " yesterday" has to offer. The vestiges are fresher — they 

 rush upon me — more trouble to dismiss the undesired ones. 

 Certainly here the}' are ! "Broadway — hospital ambulance — 

 Dr. B's clinic " — and, at last Dr. B. himself. What could be 

 more simple, I have "recalled the name." No, but was not 

 what I really did the inhibiting of the undesired reproduction 

 in order to let the chain of association follow its own laws of 

 appearance? Thus we seem to have reached Wundt's posi- 

 tion that attention is essentially the results of inhibition. We 

 cannot remain content with this conclusion for, first, practically, 

 we are unable by introspection to find evidence of any such 

 voluntary inhibition, second, theoretically, we seem to have 

 gained nothing by such an assumption for the source and nature 

 of the volition involved is as obscure as ever. What is certain is 



