MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION - Annual Report for 1998 



fishery or that does not use any of its quota by 1 June 

 forfeits its quota for the remainder of the year. Un- 

 used quotas may be allocated to other vessels for the 

 second half of the year. Any vessel that exceeds its 

 dolphin limit will have the amount of the excess 

 deducted from its quota for the following year. 



As discussed in previous annual reports, once a 

 vessel's fate was tied directly to its own performance 

 under the La Jolla Agreement, dolphin mortality 

 declined dramatically. In 1993, the first year under 

 the new international program, dolphin mortality 

 dropped below the level set for 1999. This prompted 

 parties to the agreement to adopt resolutions to reduce 

 the overall dolphin mortality limits for 1994 and 1995 

 to 9,300. In subsequent years, the mortality caps 

 established under the agreement were not reduced. 



Despite the success of the international tuna fleet in 

 reducing incidental dolphin mortality, under the 

 comparability requirements of the Marine Mammal 

 Protection Act imports of yellowfin tuna caught in the 

 eastern tropical Pacific from countries whose vessels 

 continue to set on dolphins have been precluded since 

 1994. At the 1995 meeting of the Inter- American 

 Tropical Tuna Commission, six parties to the La Jolla 

 Agreement — Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 

 Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela — issued a joint 

 statement urging the United States to lift the embar- 

 goes then in effect. In their view, catching tuna in 

 compliance with the International Dolphin Conser- 

 vation Program was environmentally sound and should 

 not be the basis for an embargo. They contended that 

 increased use of dolphin-safe fishing methods would 

 harm biodiversity by increasing the discard of juvenile 

 tuna and the bycatch of non-target species other than 

 dolphins. The nations therefore endorsed fishing for 

 tuna by setting on dolphins as the most effective 

 method for protecting the tuna stocks and other 

 resources of the eastern tropical Pacific. The six 

 nations believed that U.S. embargoes of all but 

 dolphin-safe tuna were contrary to international law, 

 lacked a scientific basis, were counterproductive to 

 broader conservation goals, and were incompatible 

 with the United States having signed the La Jolla 

 Agreement. Concerned that the current situation was 

 endangering their continued participation in the 

 program established under the La Jolla Agreement, 

 the tuna-fishing nations called on the United States to 



allow importation of tuna caught in association with 

 dolphins and to redefine the term dolphin-safe to 

 include all tuna caught in compliance with the regula- 

 tory measures adopted under the La Jolla Agreement. 



In response to the possibility that at least some 

 fishing nations would abandon the program established 

 under the La Jolla Agreement, Congress in mid- 1995 

 began to consider whether changes were needed to the 

 Marine Mammal Protection Act's mna-dolphin provi- 

 sions, particularly those on the tuna embargoes. 



The Declaration of Panama 



Concerned that an oppormnity to consolidate the 

 gains in dolphin conservation made under the La Jolla 

 Agreement was slipping away, five environmental 

 groups began discussions with representatives of 

 Mexico in September 1995 to explore the possibility 

 of a multi-lateral agreement among tuna-fishing 

 nations to formalize and strengthen the International 

 Dolphin Conservation Program and lift U.S. tuna 

 embargoes. These discussions led to a compromise 

 supported by the tuna-fishing nations, some environ- 

 mental groups, and the U.S. Administration. 



This compromise ultimately formed the basis for 

 the Declaration of Panama, an agreement signed by 

 representatives of 12 nations on 4 October 1995. 

 Signatories to the declaration included Belize, Colom- 

 bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Mexico, 

 Panama, Spain, the United States, Vanuatu, and 

 Venezuela. These nations reaffirmed their commit- 

 ment to reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern 

 tropical Pacific tuna fishery to levels approaching zero 

 through the setting of annual mortality limits, with the 

 goal of eliminating dolphin mortality by seeking a 

 means of capturing large yellowfin tuna not in associ- 

 ation with dolphins. Moreover, the nations declared 

 their intention, contingent on the enactment of changes 

 in U.S. law, to formalize by 31 January 1996 the La 

 Jolla Agreement as a binding Inter-American Tropical 

 Tuna Commission resolution or other binding legal 

 instrument. The envisioned changes to U.S. law 

 included (1) lifting the primary and secondary embar- 

 goes for tuna caught in compliance with the La Jolla 

 Agreement, as it would be modified under the Decla- 

 ration of Panama, (2) allowing access to the U.S. 

 market for all tuna, whether dolphin-safe or not, 



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