EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 1855. 9 



it as a narrow slope of an average width of less than one hundred and fifty miles of cultivable 

 land, skirting the ocean for a distance of one thousand miles ; rich in those mineral productions 

 which are tempting even beyond their value, and which would be most readily turned to the 

 use of an invader ; drained by two rivers of wide-spread branches, and with seaports lying so 

 directly upon the ocean that a hostile fleet could commence an attack upou any one of them 

 within a few hours after being descried from land ; or, if fortified against attack, so few in 

 number that comparatively few ships would sufiice to blockade them. 



This territory is not more remote from tlie principal European States than from those parts 

 of our own country whence it would derive its military supplies, and some of those States have 

 colonies and possessions on the Pacific whicli would greatly facilitate their operations against 

 it. With these advantages, and those which the attacking force always has of choice of time 

 and place, an enemy possessing a considerable military marine could, with comparatively little 

 cost to himself, subject us to enormous expenses, in giving to our Pacific frontier that protec- 

 tion which it is the duty of the general government to afi'ord. 



In the first years of a war with any great maritime power, the communication by sea could 

 not be relied upon for the transportation of supplies from the Atlantic to the Pacific States. 

 Our naval peace establishment would not furnish adequate convoys for the number of store- 

 ships which it would be necessary to employ, and storeships alone laden with supplies could 

 not undertake a voyage of twenty thousand miles, passing numerous neutral ports, where an 

 enemy's armed vessels, even of the smallest size, might lie in wait to intercept them. 



The only line of communication, then, would be overland ; and by this it would be im- 

 practicable, with any means heretofore used, to furnish the amount of supplies required for the 

 defence of the Pacific frontier. At the present prices over the best part of this route the ex- 

 pense of land transportation alone for the annual supplies of provisions, clothing, camp 

 equipage, and ammunition for such an army as it would be necessary to maintain there, would 

 exceed $20,000,000 ; and to maintain troops and carry on defensive operations under those 

 circumstances, the expense per man would be six times greater than it is now ; the land 

 transportation of each field twelve-pounder, with a due supply of ammunition for one year, 

 would cost $2,500 ; of each 24-pounder and ammunition, $9,000 ; and of a seacoast gun and 

 ammunition, $12,000. The transportation of ammunition for a year for 1,000 seacoast guns 

 would cost $10,000,000. But the expense of transportation would be vastly increased by a 

 war ; and at the rates that were paid on the northern frontier during the last war with Great 

 Britain, the above estimates would be trebled. The time required for the overland journey 

 would be from four to six months. In point of fact, however, supplies for such an army could 

 not be transported across the continent. On the arid and barren belts to be crossed, the 

 limited quantities of water and grass would soon be exhausted by the numerous draught 

 animals required for heavy trains, and over such distances forage could not be carried for their 

 subsistence. 



On the other hand, the enemy would send out his supplies at from one-seventh to one- 

 twentieth the above rates, and in less time — perhaps in one-fourth the time — if he should 

 obtain command of the isthmus routes. 



Any reliance, therefore, upon furnishing that part of our frontiefr with means of defence 



from the Atlantic and interior States, after the commencement of hostilities, would be vain, 



and the next resource would be to accumulate there such amount of stores and supplies as 



would sufiice during the continuance of the contest, or until we could obtain command of the 



2 CO 



