REGULATORY PROCESSES IN ORGANISMS 197 
esses,‘ which are based on the phenomena of regulation are not 
proofs at all, because the ‘machine’ which he has in mind is com- 
parable to the dead, rather than to tne living organism, to the 
river frozen solid, rather than to the river flowing. If we could 
separate a portion of this frozen river with its channel from the 
rest 1t would of course remain what it was, 7.e., a part, so longas it 
remained frozen. But if we divert any sufficient quantity of water 
from the flowing river it is capable of forming a whole which shows 
all the essential characteristics of the original river, though not 
identical with it. In short each flowing river, with its banks and 
bed is a ‘machine’ according to Driesch’s definition, ‘eine typische 
chemisch-physikalische Spezifititskombination”’ (Driesch, ’01, p. 
187), and it may become whole when parts are taken from it or 
when their relative position is changed; moreover, when it is 
divided, each part may form a whole essentially similar in its 
processes and structure to the original whole. The existence of 
such a ‘machine’ is therefore a sufficient refutation of these ‘proofs’ 
of Driesch’s. So long as the current flows such regulatory proc- 
esses are not only possible but necessary, when the conditions 
arise. Neither the organism nor the river ‘remain w ole’ when 
parts are taken from them, but they become new wholes, which 
under similar conditions, may become more or less like the original 
whole (Child, ’08b), but which under other conditions, may be 
different. 
Driesch’s error is two-fold: although his general definition of a 
‘machine’ is sufficiently broad, his argument in the ‘proofs’ is 
based only on a certain type of machine, viz., that constructed by 
man for function, a type which is wholly passive during its con- 
“A brief statement of the first two ‘proofs’ is as follows: 
‘“‘Erstens: Eine Maschine bleibt nicht dieselbe, wenn man ihr beliebige Teile 
nimmt oder ihre Teile beliebig verlagert; deshalb kann das sich auf Basis harmon- 
isch-iquipotentieller Systeme abspielende Formbildungsgeschehen kein maschi- 
nelles chemisch-physikalisches Geschehen sein. 
““Zweitens: Eine nach den drei Dimensionen typisch spezifisch verschiedene 
Maschine bleibt nicht ganz, wenn sie geteilt wird, deshalb liegt der Genese iquipo- 
tentieller Systeme mit komplexen Potenzen im Bereiche des Formbildungsges- 
chehen kein maschinelles chemisch-physikalisches Geschehen zu Grunde.”’ 
Driesch, ’03, p. 74.) 
