198 C. M. CHILD 
struction, rather than on a type in which, as in the organism, the 
structure at each stage is determined by the function and the 
structure in the preceding stage. The organism iscomparable not 
to the constructed ‘machine’ alone but to the machine plus the 
constructing activity, and since Driesch has confined his argument 
to the type of machine constructed by man for a definite purpose, 
he is very naturally and logically led to the assumption ofa 
constructor. His ‘proofs’ are equivalent to the argument that 
because a ditch built by man for a particular purpose and possess- 
ing a specific structure but containing no water does not remain 
whole or the same when we take away parts of its banks or bot- 
tom, therefore the river, as we see it in nature cannot be a physico- 
chemical system. 
Similarly in his consideration of the organism he has failed to 
take account of the constructive activity of the continuous flow 
of energy in a given environment. The organism is, he says, con- 
structed for function. His position is identical with that of our 
hypothetical man who concluded that the channel of the river 
must have been constructed for the water, and like him, Driesch 
has given his imagined constructor a name, or rather has adopted 
an old one for it, viz., entelechy. Most of us have concluded from 
our observations and experiments that the channel of the river is 
constructed by the activity of the current and we have some rather 
conclusive evidence upon that point. Before he can hope to see 
his views accepted, our man must actually prove or make it at 
least probable that this is not so. The burden of proof lies wholly 
upon him. And similarly, until Driesch can make it at least 
probable that the organism is constructed for and not by function, 
instead of merely assuming this to be the fact, he cannot expect. 
to find wide acceptance for his views. Nowhere in Driesch’s work 
do we find any convincing evidence upon this point: Driesch has 
simply chosen to assume that it is so. I am of course aware that 
Driesch regards entelechy as in constant connection with physico- 
chemical factors and as working with these as means. But I 
see no reason why, if we postulate an entelechy for the organism, 
we should not at least be consistent and postulate another for the 
river. 
