lo Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



The large part of Marshall's book dealing with aesthetics 

 and the art impulse we cannot include in this sketch but simply 

 recognize its suggestiveness and interest to the psychologist and 

 artist alike. 



We add the following notes from Ladd's " Psychology, 

 Descriptive and Explanatory," Chapter IX. Feeling: Its Nahire 

 and Classes. " With all this hopeful endeavor it will never be 

 possible, however, to reduce to a strictly scientific form the life 

 of sentiment and emotion. It is necessary, in the interests of 

 science, to acknowledge this at the outset, and with the utmost 

 candor." "The real and essential Nature of Feeling, as such, 

 cannot be described . . ." "Description is in language, but 

 language itself is the expression of conceptions and thoughts. 

 And the conception of any feeling differs foto ccclo from the feel- 

 ing itself." Feeling is irreducible. The physiological and 

 ideational theories are both rejected. The theory that feeling 

 is pleasure-pain only; that apparant "qualities" are due to 

 associations — this is simplicity "gone entirely mad." 



Feeling is the subjective part of sense-experience. Those 

 experiences therefore which are least objectified are richest in 

 feelings. * Feelings cannot be identified with the sensations. 



Ladd claims to have abandoned " even the appearance of 

 retaining the old and vicious theory of faculties," but read the 

 following (p. 172). " All the neural processes underlying the 

 different psychic facts are of one kind. But we have seen that, 

 ultimately considered, in the light of introspective analysis, all 

 the resulting psychic facts have tJiree aspects ; they are facts of 

 intellection and connation not only, but also facts of feeling." 

 ' ' Discriminating consciousness analyses in a triune way what 

 psycho-physics regards as conditioned upon the occurence of a phy- 

 sical cJiajige essentially the same.'" 



" At any particular moment the kind and amount of feel- 

 ing experienced has for its physiological condition the total 

 complex relation in which all the subordinate neural processes, 

 set up by the stimuli of that moment stand to one another and 

 the set, or direction, of pre-existing related neural processes." 



"We classify the feelings by reference to the intellectual 



