2 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



sciousness. Against the first view he decides because we 

 find the same pecuHarities, quahty, intensity, and duration, 

 which are ascribed to sensation. It is illogical then to speak of 

 a process having these properties as a property of sensation 

 along with the self-same properties. When the above proper- 

 ties disappear the sensation of which they are properties disap- 

 pears with them but the feeling may vanish and the sensation 

 persist. Feeling cannot therefore be a necessary attribute of 

 sensation. 



Feelings are in a sense functions of sensation in so far as 

 an observed parallelism exists, but feelings are not directly de- 

 pendent on the qualities of sensation. Nor is it directly obvious 

 that the intensity of sensation determines its accompanying 

 feelings. 



The so-called elementary aesthetic feelings due to form and 

 relations of sensation vary too much to stand in any fundamen- 

 tal relation to sensation. The author chooses the third view, 

 that feelings constitute independent elements of consciousness. 



But to return to Marshall ; accepting four fundamental 

 mental activities, sensation, emotion, intellect and will, he finds 

 pleasure-pain much more closely connected with the former 

 than the latter pair. 



In favor of the view that pleasure and pain are sensations 

 Mr. Nichols has urged that pains are as disparate as are many sen- 

 sations. Mr. Marshall very properly replies that in those pains 

 which seem most distinct there is always something beside the 

 pain — a cutting, or pricking or the like which forms its criterion 

 and serves to isolate it. We may add that pain and pleasure 

 are per se essentially non-localizable. It is association with sen- 

 sation which adds the localization. Pain from its character is 

 much more likely to be thus associated, as we shall see, and this 

 accounts for the fact noted by Marshall that the common usage 

 is more likely to speak of pain as a sensation and pleasure as 

 an emotion. 



A second argument for the sensational nature of pain is 

 derived from the fact that mechanical treatment may induce 

 pain in a nerve trunk while no manipulation of them can pro- 



