130 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



Professor Ziehen is an exception ; he defines feeling as "a 

 presentation to consciousness " and thus, on mere logical 

 grounds, ridicules the idea of unconscious feelings. Aside from 

 Ziehen and his class there is a fair agreement on the meaning of 

 the word as " an element of consciousness " ; and Professor C. 

 Mercier, in Hack Tuke's Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, 

 speaks in the same sense of consciousness (see sub voce ' ' Con- 

 sciousness ") as "a bundle of feelings." Professor Herrick de- 

 fines feeling as "an affection or state of consciousness" 

 which definition he regards as of " almost universal usage"; 

 but I submit that this definition implies a theory which Profes- 

 sor Herrick would scarcely sanction ; it implies that conscious- 

 ness has an existence in itself and that feelings are its various- 

 states or affections. This seems actually to be Ziehen's idea, 

 for if feelings are states of, or presentations to, consciousness 

 and not parts or elements of consciousness, it would indeed be 

 absurd to talk of unconscious or even subconscious feelings. 

 Consciousness, however, is not a thing in itself; it is not a unity 

 but a unification, or, as Wundt says, not an EinJicity butan£///- 

 keitlichkcit. Its elements can exist also in isolation ; and when 

 they are no longer co-ordinated in a special way, consciousness 

 ceases, while the elements of consciousness may continue to ex- 

 ist. There is no entire eradication of all sentiency if, as in 

 sleep, consciousness is obliterated. 



While I believe myself to be in agreement with the leading 

 psychologists as regards the usage of the term "feeling," I 

 confess that my usage of the term "intelligence" may be a 

 departure from the traditional usage of the word. "Intelli- 

 gence" is frequently used as a synonym of "consciousness" 

 or "conscious knowledge" in the sense of "noting" or 

 "minding," while to me its essential quality is the methodical 

 interrelation which is, or can be, established between mental 

 images. It is a fact that long chains of reasoning frequently 

 take place unconsciously, yet are they performed for some defi- 

 nite purpose and may legitimately be called "intelligent"; 

 they conform to the rules, of logic, and determine in an appro- 

 priate way conditions in our objective surroundings. Whether 



