Editorial. 213 



other cases constitutes a quale of the perception or the Hke. 

 There is a duahsm then dependent on the extent to which the 

 direct impression is reinforced by indirect or reflected results of 

 the stimulus. 



On the kinesodic side a somewhat similar dualism exists. 

 Thus the motor origins whence the real nervous force involved 

 in our acts is derived are chiefly infra-cortical. The vast major- 

 ity of such acts are performed without the aid of consciousness. 

 Even in cases where the subsidiary cortical current actually 

 passes it may awaken no consciousness. (This is explained 

 upon a dynamic theory of consciousness. The cells are indeed 

 excited by the current but, for whatever reason, no interference 

 or kinesodic reaction is produced. Only when an antagonistic 

 wave is set up is consciousness possible. This does not, how- 

 ever, prevent an unconscious process from awaking conscious- 

 ness afterwards by vestigeal action.) But when both ssthes- 

 odic irritation and kinesodic response occur in consciousness we 

 acquire a new idea of relation, i. e. sequence, cause. When 

 the preliminary to the kinesodic discharge is a complicated co- 

 ordination of vestiges the response acquires a highly purposive 

 character. (It is worth noting in this connection that such ideas 

 as sequence, duality, plurality, multiplicity, etc. , must of neces- 

 sity have a unitary or qualitative psychological basis. Crudely 

 illustrating the nature of the neuroses in this field, we might 

 suggest that the superposition of similar vestiges would give 

 rise to an impression of identity while the superposition of an 

 *' objective presentation " upon a vestigeal one of the same kind 

 produces the impression ot succession. Time in its purely pre- 

 sentative aspect seems capable of a somewhat similar construc- 

 tion.) Those kinesodic activities which deal with the reactions 

 of motor vestiges on sensory vestiges of successively higher or- 

 ders bring us to the higher intellectual processes. We come, 

 at any rate, to the apprehension of processes felt by us and 

 processes not felt by us — things "done by us" and things 

 "not done by us." We have here the two "points of view" 

 on which Morgan et al. rely to establish two ' ' aspects of reali- 



