214 Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



ity. " Our analysis, tabetic as it has been, serves to indicate 

 how insufficient the data are to serve as criteria of reality. 



Only one thing of all this is psychical — consciousness. 

 Our idea of non-conscious activities is reached by the method 

 of difference. Our judgement that part of our acts are uncon- 

 scious means simply that the same sensory state is often com- 

 bined with different amounts of kinesodic activities. A "dual- 

 ism of experience" does not exist, only a dualism of judge- 

 ment. Consciousness does not give us directly a distinction 

 between self and not self. Self is a conception dependent not 

 on the antinomies of the conscious and non-conscious but on 

 the variable mixtures of kinesodic and aesthesodic actions. Do 

 we then at last find the two aspects of experience in the two 

 phases of consciousness due to kinesodic and aesthesodic action 

 respectively? Evidently not. Consciousness of what I have 

 done and what I have experienced are both irresolvable activi- 

 ties, though their physiological occasions are combinations. 

 Consciousness is different from the neuroses or forces which oc- 

 casion it, not another aspect of them. We may illustrate from 

 physics. When two forces are in antagonistic equilibrium the 

 forces are destroyed, i. e. are replaced by energy. This energy 

 is something different from its component forces. Our dualism 

 is one of limitations. Spatial relations are developed from se- 

 quences and before they reach perception are translated into the 

 interaction of residua. Thus we speak of immediately per- 

 ceiving a colored space as extended, limited, etc. But the 

 concept of space arose in the first place through sequences of 

 sensori-motor coordinations. After these are once formed they 

 are represented by residua which serve to present spatial ideas, 

 as we say, directly. In like manner we become through habit 

 unconscious of the scaffold by which most of our higher con- 

 cepts are reached. 



It is not necessary to amplify farther. The suggestions 

 from neurology seem to us to be consistent with neither dualism 

 nor materialistic monism but instead with a form of dynamic 

 monism. - C. L. Herrick. 



