Editorial. 2/ 



has left only this element ? I could not tell, but, as I turned 

 back and the foundation came into view, I suddenly became 

 aware of the concrete wliich had been the origin of my abstract 

 — it was the foundation which bore no resemblance to the brick 

 building. A concept of incompleteness could form an inde- 

 pendent element in a dream and associate with itself the most 

 heterogeneous elements. 



It is true that dreams often consist in simply sensuous 

 images, but these are not dreams proper but states of visual 

 fantasy in no way different from those which one has before 

 falling asleep. 



Where sensuous images play a part in true dreams there is 

 usually but one sense occupied at one time. On waking we 

 add the associative elements from other senses unconsciously. 

 Thus a dream ^which contained only visual sensuous elements 

 and a series of general concepts is clothed with tactile sensa- 

 tions and the concepts are furnished with words. How often 

 in attempting to relate a dream which seemed perfectly clear in 

 recollection have we been obliged to subject it to curious meta- 

 morphoses in order to adapt it to speech in any form. Our or- 

 dinary speech does not enable us to accurately describe the tact 

 that we were in some way prepossessed by a feeling of danger 

 and, looking up, saw a mountain, which was not a mountain 

 but a painted canvas, which seemed about to fall upon us and 

 yet, at the same time, would only fall upon us in the belief of 

 some other people (perhaps an audience) while we knew that it 

 was all a play and we should escape, but that nevertheless we 

 must feel a certain fear in our capacity as players. Such a com- 

 bination of concepts (derived from a recent dream) we would 

 either describe as a dream of being in Pompeii or acting a part 

 in a play representing the destruction ot Pompeii. 



The careful study of dreams shows that the interpretation 

 of our own immediate mental states is much more complicated 

 than psychologists are wont to admit. Tlie idea that, by intro- 

 spection, we reach simple and unambiguous realities of our ex- 

 perience is founded on a fallacy which is especially obvious in 

 the recollection of a dream. As Miinsterberg well says of will : 



