clxii Journal of Comparative Neurology. 



Kantian Anschauung by " at sight" (that which we receive directly 

 by sensation, our meaning-endowed feelings ) the ;iuthor has no use 

 for intuition in the conventional sense. The data of experience ex- 

 hibit three elements (i) the feelings — the element of awareness simply, 

 (2) the forms of feeling — the various sensations, etc., (3) the meaning 

 of feelings — representations and the objective world. 



The influence of Lotze may be seen in such a statement as " The 

 peculiarity of existences, consists in affecting other existen- 

 ces and this constitutes its objectivity. " The thinking sub- 

 ject appears to other thinking subjects as an object in an 

 objective world. We are feelings, but we appear to other subjects as 

 material bodies moving about in space. Admitting that it is difficult 

 to conceive what the subjectivity of a flame or stone amounts to, he 

 claims that "we know that in inorganic nature there must be some- 

 thing analogous to our feelings on a lower scale." While this is the 

 basis of positivistic monism it is just this for which the critic seeks 

 in vain for proof. 



Truth is defined as the adequateness of a mental relation — an 

 agreement of a representation with the object representation. 

 It is of the nature of mind to attempt to satisfy the con- 

 ditions of relation and the mind therefore yearns after truth, 

 which is the deepest impulse of the mind, for truth is the fulfilment of 

 the mind. 



We are glad to agree with the author in his summary dismission 

 of the axiom, than which a more abused word can scarcely be found, 

 Very reasonably the childish quibble of some modern mathematicians 

 as to the possibility that the sum of the angles in a triangle should be 

 greater or less than 180 degrees is dismissed with the remark that this 

 class of necessary formal truth rests on construction, i. e. definition. 

 Defining space as the possibility of motion, he proceeds to lay the 

 foundation for a new system of geometry as to the success of which 

 there will be a variety of opinion. [ More logical to us is a method 

 which defines a point as the negation of motion i. e. as zero ; all mo- 

 tions therefore become plus quantities and «-dimentional space is pos. 

 sible until zero is given a value, n. This is done by defining the 

 position of zero with respect to some other zero, <?', when 00 or 0' n 

 becomes a line. Any given motion or direction once postulated be- 

 comes a line- of reference and «-dimentional space is then excluded. 

 This empirical element in human geometry is gravitation.] 



The three-dimentional space we, like the author, regard as in- 

 volved in the system by definition and not an arbitrary necessity of 



