ADAMS: THE CONTROL OF 1 H K PURSE. 223 



on Appropriations. When that committee has submitted its report 

 the bill is either accepted or amended. If it is amended it is sent 

 back to the House for reconsideration. In the case of money bills 

 the House almost invariably refuses to accept the amendments, and 

 proposes a conference committee of three members from each house; 

 the Senate accepts the proposition and the committee usually changes 

 the bill so that it becomes a compromise and fails to meet the real 

 purpose of either house. The question arises, is there anything in 

 this system which prevents the realization of the principle that the 

 people should control the purse? How does it influence the budget? 



It is found that two evils result from the committee system. The 

 first is that the origination of money bills by a number of committees 

 prevents homogeneity in the financial measures of the year. The 

 committee of Ways and Means need have no communication with 

 that on Appropriations. Each committee may prepare its bills abso- 

 lutely without reference to the measures proposed by the others. In 

 the appropriations for ordinary and general expenses of the govern- 

 ment the income of the year is probably referred to, and in its con- 

 sideration of measures for raising revenue the Ways and Means 

 committee must provide for the customary expenditures for the year, 

 but there must result either lack of harmony or a lack of appreciation 

 of the exact needs and conditions in revenue and expense. It is an 

 arrangement which would not be tolerated in any private business 

 enterprise. When the budget of the year is drawn up it should be 

 known just what revenue may reasonably be expected and for just 

 what expenses that revenue is to be used. These might be changed, 

 but if alterations were made it should be by way of cutting out one 

 item and inserting another in its place so that the general estimates 

 would be retained. At present there is not that careful balancing of 

 income and expenditure which would probably be secured if the 

 whole budget were in the hands of one committee. In any other 

 country such a system would long ago have resulted in financial 

 disaster, but until recently the United States has been blessed with 

 a surplus that permitted the Appropriations committee to proceed 

 almost without reference to the propositions of the committee em- 

 powered to raise money. Such a system has naturally resulted in 

 foolish expenditure, extravagance and looseness in accounts. 



This divided committee system of the House is unwise also in 

 that it lessens the responsibility of the committees to the House. 

 When a committee presents a bill it knows that the House has less 

 interest in the bill than could be relied upon if the effect of the 

 passage of one bill u])()n other financial measures could be appreci- 

 ated. Because of this lack of interest the committee knows that the 



