ADAMS: THK CONTROL OF THK PURSE. 227 



SO that there shall be harmony in budgetary legislation. The revenue 

 and expenditure sides of the budget would be much more likely to be 

 carefully balanced by one committee than by several. This sugges- 

 tion would probably result in better business methods, but it would 

 not in any way affect the main question of effective responsibility. 

 It would ensure a more careful consideration of the relation between 

 taxation and expenditure, but it could not secure to the people any 

 real control over either the extent or purpose of such taxation and 

 expenditure. 



A second suggestion is, that the number of the members of the House 

 of Representatives be diminished and that the committees be chosen 

 entirely from the ranks of the majority. It is urged that by reducing 

 the number of representatives the number of voters necessary to elect 

 a representative is increased so that he is made a national, instead of 

 a sectional, representative, with national rather than sectional respon- 

 sibility. This is true only to a limited extent. It might be possible 

 to gain an improved responsibility in this way, but not an effective 

 responsibility. The fewer the representatives the greater will be the 

 influence of any one representative's vote in deciding national policy, 

 and moreover he will be inclined to view questions from a national 

 rather than from a sectional standpoint. But this does not alter the 

 measure of his responsibility to his constituents in any degree. The 

 second part of the suggestion is intended to make the party in power 

 responsible for the propositions of its committees, but it does not 

 ■appear how it will accomplish this result. In Congress today the 

 majority in the House have a majority of their own number on every 

 important committee. The responsibility of the majority is as effec- 

 tive under the present system as it would be if none but the members 

 of the majority formed the committee. Neither of these suggestions 

 touches the real trouble underlying the committee system of govern- 

 ment. 



A third suggestion, which does recognize this evil, is that to the 

 President shall be given the power of appointing the chairmen and 

 members of the committees of the House. The argument is as fol- 

 lows: This power could be given to the President without any radical 

 change in the seemingly indispensable committee system. It would, 

 it is true, greatly increase the power of the executive over legislation, 

 but it would not be so apparent a change of the forms of government 

 as to rouse the opposition of the people. It would bring to the voter 

 the realization of his idea, at present erroneous, that in his vote for 

 President he has a direct influence upon legislation. The President, 

 by the appointment of members of committees whose ideas upon 

 financial legislation agreed with his own, would become the one 



