230 KANSAS UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY. 



necessary in present customs and institutions are as follows: first, the 

 election of President and members of the House of Representatives 

 for the same length of time, second; the choice of Presidential electors 

 by districts within states, instead of by states as units, third; the 

 giving to the President the right of appointment of committees in the 

 House. The first of these changes would render necessary a change 

 in the constitution, the second would require primarily a change in 

 custom and might involve a change in the constitution, while the third 

 would demand a change in custom only. 



The first and second of these proposals have been made many 

 times, but their advocates have had other ends in view than that here 

 proposed. The first proposal would necessitate an alteration in the 

 length of term either of the President or of the Representatives, re- 

 ducing the Presidential term to two years or increasing that of the 

 Representatives to four. (Ine slight constitutional change wouUl -be 

 sufficient for this eml in either case. Tlie second proposal would in- 

 volve, primarily, a change in custom, although a constitutional change 

 might be necessary finally. According to the constitution the legis- 

 lature of each state determines the methoil of choosing presidential 

 electors, and it has usually been done by general ticket. Some of 

 the states, however ])r()vided for elections by districts but the ])lan 

 was everywhere abandoned by 1832. Recently it has been revived 

 in the State of Michigan. The necessity for a possible constitutional 

 change is e.xplained by the following conditions. According to the 

 constitution the number of electors to which each state is entitled 

 shall be "equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives 

 to which the state may be entitled in Congress." ICach state would 

 have two more Electors than Representatives in Congress and for this 

 reason either the Electoral districts could not be made to correspond 

 exactly to the Representative ilistricts, or two electors must be chosen 

 at large. As the general ticket vote of a state does not always correspond 

 to its majorities by districts, and the two electors at large might not 

 agree with those chosen in the districts, it is conceivable that the 

 electoral college might elect a President not in harmony with a ma- 

 jority in the House although it is not probable. To obviate this 

 difficulty a constitutional change would be necessaay, reducing by two 

 the vote of each state in the electoral college, making in each state 

 the number of Presidential electors equal to that of the Representa- 

 tives. 



The two ])roposals already considered involving certainly one, and 

 ])0ssibly two, alterations in established institutions, apparently insure 

 harmony between the President and the House of Representatives, 

 but they do not alter in any direct way the nation's power of control 



