ADAMS: THE CONTROL OF THE PURSE. 23 I 



over governmental action. In order to provide this direct control, 

 the third plan, that of permitting the President to appoint the standing 

 committees of the House, must be included in the proposed remedy. 

 The points in its favor have been outlined in the preceding pages. 

 There is no constitutional provision involved. It has been the House 

 custom to give the speaker the ])0\ver of appointment and to confer 

 that right upon the President would require a change in custom. 



The combination of these three proposals secures as great a measure 

 of effective responsibility as does either the cabinet system or the pro- 

 posal of the socialist party, and with much less change in the written 

 law of the land. In each case, however, it is certain that adoption, 

 whether of the cabinet system, the socialist plan, or that of giving to the 

 President power over committees, means in the end the elevation to 

 great authority of one man who is sotne how really responsible for his 

 actions. Under the cabinet system this man is the Premier, under 

 the Socialist system he is the chairman of the "Executive Poard," 

 and under the last form he is the President of the United States. 

 Each of these proposals necessitates the union to a great degree, of 

 executive with legislative functions, or at least with the function of 

 originating legislation, and in this respect the plans are alike in in- 

 volving a change in the theory of the constitution. It is commonly 

 asserted that the constitution intended a division of the main functions 

 of government into three distinct heads, executive, legislative, and 

 judicial. While it is doubtful whether such a division^ is practicable, 

 yet if this principle be accepted as constitutional then it must be 

 acknowledged that any one of the proposed changes directly challenges 

 the theory of the constitution. 



In this sketch of the history of budgetary principles and rules in the 

 United States it has been noted that the constitutional convention de- 

 clared for the control of taxation by the people; that the House of 

 Representatives emphatically asserted the same principle in contests 

 with the Secretary of the Treasury and with the Senate, but that the 

 necessary organization of Congress and particularly the committee 

 system of the House have made impossible a perfect realization of this 

 principle, so that some reform is urgently necessary. Next it has 

 been observed that accepting the committee system as a necessary 

 business arrangement any effective reform which gives the people a 

 control of financial legislation, insures the same responsibility for all 

 other legislation. Finally, it is afifirmed that there are at least three ways 

 in which effective control may be secured, but that two of these in- 

 volve a considerable change in established institutions, while a third 

 involves only minor changes and is therefore preferable. In the end, 

 however, it is conceded that any effective reform must mean a change 



