272 KANSAS UNIVERSITY QUAR TERI.V. 



Wit must be directed by Study; Study must be occupied in a proper 

 manner; questions that may not be answered must be passed by; and 

 answers that may not be understood must be accepted on authority, 

 by faith. 



i^a„jjiand"(.i Langland thinks too much and too widely not to 



mental habit. touch sometimes upon the questions of the physical 

 and mental life of man. For instance, he wonders why man, with 

 his double portion of intelligence, is so prone to make mistakes; while 

 other animals with their lesser portion, always act rightly with refer- 

 ence to their own interests (C, XIV., 143). Yet, recognizing the 

 difference in phenomena he did not for a moment conceive a dis- 

 tinction between instinct and reason, but immediately gave up the 

 whole question, fearing that he was treading upon forbidden ground. 

 But this speculative passage, though it ends in a stinging self-rebuke, 

 shows that his mind is of too high an order to follow a beaten path 

 without thinking what lay beyond it, and deepens our respect for his 

 mental power. 



Langland's inveterate habit of personification sometimes leads to 

 apparent confusion as to the meaning of terms; but in general his dis- 

 tinctions are clear when his conceptions can be disentangled from 

 their personal embodiment. The moral significance of his terms is 

 to be taken into account along with their mental and physical mean- 

 ing, as this moral meaning was to him their chief one. 



Theiientai It seems probable that Langland's own ideas of the 



Faouiti<'M. meaning of the various names for the mental faculties 

 were derived from the passage translated, not altogether accurately, 

 in Passus XVII., (B, XV., 23; C, XVII., 182). The character called 

 Anima in B, Freewill in C, is defined according to its various func- 

 tions as Anima (the vital principle) when it quickens the body; Ani- 

 mus (the reasoning principle or rational soul) when it will or would; 

 Mens (the power of thought, the mind) when it understands or 

 knows; Memoria, when it recalls what has taken place ("makes 

 moan to God"); Ratio, when it judges; Sensus, when it feels 

 and perceives ("and that is wit and wisdom, the well of all 

 crafts"); Conscientia, when it challenges (claims or excuses) or 

 challenges not, bargains for or refuses (accepts or refuses); Amor, 

 when it loves; Liberum arbitrium, when it will do or not do good 

 deeds or ill (Lat. : turns from evil to the good); and Spiritus, when it 

 flees from the body and leaves it lifeless. In the B-text all these 

 terms except Free Will are given as names for Anima; but in the 

 C-text they are given as names for Free Will, which is inserted and 

 made to assume undue importance. The B-text is most consistent 

 with the Latin original (Skeat, Notes, 215; C, XVII., 201), and with 



