HOPKINS: CHARACTER AND OPINIONS OF WILLIAM LANGLAND. 273 



the present accepted interpretation of the terms used. To say that 

 this is a list of the specific functions or faculties of the soul is com- 

 prehensible; to say that the soul is a faculty of the will, and that the 

 will is a faculty of itself, is to us nonsense. 

 Aniina. or ^^ this passage we should have a guide to the philo- 

 liife. sophical interpretation of several important characters. 



Anima is mentioned elsewhere (C, XI,, 127 ff.) as dwelling in a 

 castle made of the four elements, earth, air, wind and water; 

 she is dear to Kynde (interpreted as Nature, God) and is like Him. 

 For safety she is placed in this castle whose lord is Dowel; his 

 daughter Dobet is her servant; above both, peer of a bishop, is 

 Dobest, her teacher, Inwit (Conscience) is constable of that castle; 

 and with him are the other wits, his five sons, Seewell, Saywell, Hear- 

 well, Workwell, and Goodfaith Gowell;- — not exactly the five senses, 

 but a conception of Langland's own of the agencies most likely to re- 

 pel Satan. 



The list of mental faculties given above is taken from Isidore 

 (Skeat, Notes, 215). Following another source of popular philosophy, 

 Langland says that Inwit is in the head and Anima in the heart. 

 This statement is derived from Galen (Skeat, Notes, 140), who 

 divides the functions into the vital, essential to life, whose seat is the 

 heart; animal, perceived and subject to the will, whose seat is the 

 head; natural, not perceived, whose seat is the liver. We are some- 

 what at a loss to determine whether Langland regards Anima as the 

 vital function simply, common to men and other animals; or whether 

 it is with him the more exalted if indefinable conception called the 

 soul. The first passage seems to subordinate it unduly; the second is 

 indecisive until we are told that it is like Kynde. Since Kynde un- 

 doubtedly means God in this case, possibly we here touch the higher 

 conception. 



<"oiiwc-ieno«'. If conscience is an animal function, subject to the 

 will, we are likely to land in confusion; but probably in making its 

 seat the head Langland did not intend to follow Galen any farther. 

 Rather he views conscience as an intellectual faculty under Divine 

 direction. He has drawn a broad line of demarcation between Anima 

 and Conscience, whatever his reason may have been; and again it 

 seems as though to him Anima could be little more than physical 

 life. 



The character of (Conscience as a moral teacher is one of the most 

 consistently treated in the poem. Conscience is of the counsel of 

 Truth, and cannot be deceived. Holy Writ is his guide upon doubt- 

 ful points, but he insists upon a true interpretation. He is guided by 

 Reason (C, Y., 5) but is free to enlighten Reason before the lalter 



