Woods: Decline of Autocracy 39 
All this may be in some measure 
explanatory or not; at any rate the fact 
is that, while European history has 
shown for the last eight centuries a 
tendency for autocrats to become less 
numerous, it has not shown the same 
tendency towards a disappearance of 
autocrats of the first magnitude, those 
whom we find especially predisposing 
towards war. 
In the history of England and France 
autocrats can be studied from the 
eleventh century onward. These are 
countries that have developed demo- 
cratic institutions. Let us see if there 
is evidence of a gradual decline in the 
numbers of autocratic sovereigns 
throughout the centuries. Adding the 
numbers from both these countries 
together, we get the series from the 
year 1000 to the year 1900 by centuries 
as follows: 2, 4, 4, 2, 3, 4, 2, 0, 2; that 
is, there were two autocrats in the 
eleventh century, four in the twelfth, 
ete. It can be seen that the left-hand 
half of this series is heavier than the 
right. The ratio of weight is 13.5 
to 9.5. Here we have numerical proof 
that autocracy has declined in France 
and England. This is significant as 
far as it goes, though the numbers are 
small. 
If, on the other hand, we turn to 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria, we do not 
find the same tendency towards a de- 
cline in the number of autocrats. Fig- 
ures for the early history of these 
countries are not available, but the 
records from the beginning of the fif- 
teenth century are complete. The totals 
for each century are, according to our 
chart, 4, 2, 3,5, 5. In these countries, 
then, just the opposite has taken place 
from what occurred in England and 
France. The right-hand, or modern 
portion of this series, weighs against 
the left in the ratio of 11.5 to 7.5.. Are 
these figures significant? They are 
quite as likely to be as the reverse 
figures, 13.5 to 9.5, which suggested a 
decline in autocracy in France and 
England. 
Both numbers are necessarily small, 
as we are dealing with a matter where 
only a few examples can be cited; but 
the figures warn us against assuming 
that democratic tendencies are constant 
in their growth or that they are part of 
the development of modern civilization. 
Here are three great nations whose 
territories cover a large portion of 
Europe, whose vast populations, if 
judged by their achievements, have 
unquestionably, at least until recently, 
advanced, both intellectually and ma- 
terially, since the beginning of the 
fifteenth century, yet autocratic gover- 
nance has actually been growing. 
An answer, much more definite than 
this, to the whole question of the magni- 
tude and distribution of autocracies in 
European history is gained by an appeal 
to all available instances from the 
eleventh century onward. A table con- 
taining such statistics is here given (see 
Table II). It shows two facts clearly. 
First, that as far as all autocrats are 
concerned there has been, in recent cen- 
turies, a decline in their numbers, and, 
second, it shows that, as far as the 
greatest autocrats are concerned, the 
reverse process was in operation up to 
about the year 1600. Since that date, all 
autocrats, both great and small, have 
been losing ground. The figures form 
such a regular series that little doubt is 
left as to their significance. Compare the 
earlier and the later halves of the table. 
If the totals for the 100 greatest auto- 
crats be considered, the four centuries 
and a half prior to the year 1450 furnish, 
as compared with the subsequent 450 
years, autocrats in the ratio of 190.7 to 
96.4, or practically twice as many. 
From this the ratios change in an almost 
perfect gradation. For the first 50 auto- 
crats the ratios virtually balance, being 
63.5 to 62.8. For the first 40 we find 
more in the latter than in the earlier 
period. The ratios are 55.1 to 40.8. 
These rise for the first 30, being 44.4 to 
26.3, sink for the first 20, though they 
exceed the first 40, and in final con- 
firmation we find the highest ratio for 
the first 10 or greatest autocrats still on 
the same side of the balance, being 15.9 
to 8.6 in favor of the late period or right- 
hand half of the chart. In other words, 
compared with the 450 preceding years, 
the last 450 have produced nearly twice 
