Popenoe: Eugenics and Morality 



79 



other crimes and vices of which a con- 

 ference on social work can take cog- 

 nizance. 



Divine revekition is no longer a 

 sufficient guide for many thoughtful 

 people. 



Conscience, for such reasons as I 

 indicated above, is but a will-of-the- 

 wisp. 



THE PLACE FOR INTELLIGENCE 



It is obvious, I think, that only in 

 intelligent analysis of a situation is to 

 be found any sound basis for morality. 

 I do not wish to be thought to overrate 

 the possibilities of intelligence. The 

 human mind, at best, is a feeble and 

 imperfect instrument. Even when pro- 

 vided with the best of principles, it too 

 often goes wholly astray. The rea- 

 soning powers of the mind are all too 

 often devoted solely to inventing a 

 plausible justification for what the 

 so-called instincts have already led 

 their possessor to do. It is of primary 

 importance that the intelligence, such 

 as it is, have sound principles on which 

 to act. Of the many bases from which 

 philosophers have tried to derive a 

 rational morality,^ but one stands, in 

 the last analysis, as unimpeachable. 

 The survival, and improvement, of the 

 race or group, is the one end to which 

 others must, if necessary, be subordi- 

 nate. Conduct which leads to the 

 deterioration, or extinction, of the 

 group which practises it, can only be 

 considered evil conduct. A good, 

 righteous, worthy, or social act must, 

 therefore, be one that tends to favor the 

 survival of the group or race. Here, it 

 seems to me, is the sound basis for 

 morality; and I therefore accept, as the 

 most useful of the various conceptions 

 ciitrent, the definition of morality as 



= The types of moral theory may be classified as absolute and relative. The first type, exempli- 

 fied by the doctrines of Immanuel Kant, supposes that there are certain "eternal and irnmutable" 

 principles of conduct (which, in the opinion of most of the absolutist philosophers, are intuitively 

 perceived). The relativists measure the value of an act by its consequences. The best-advertised 

 of the relativistic theories is Utilitarianism, expounded enthusiastically by Jeremy Bentham, 

 John Stuart Mill, and many other able men a century or less ago, with "the greatest happiness of 

 the greatest number" as a campaign cry. 



Or types of moral theory may be classed as intuitional and empirical. The former listens for 

 the guidance of an "inward monitor" or "still, small voice"; the latter bases its judgments on the 

 experience of how an act "works." 



The theory which I am here upholding is of course to be classed as relativistic and empirical. 



It goes without saying that no com- 

 plicated action of an individual is 

 determined by only one of these factors. 

 Ordinarily, no doubt, all five of them, 

 and others, enter in to decide the resul- 

 tant behavior. But as one or another 

 will predominate, or be consciously 

 emphasized, I think the classification 

 I have just given is legitimate for my 

 present purpose. 



Now, out of this complicated make- 

 up of "morality," where is any solid 

 ground to be found, on which the so- 

 cially-minded individual can take a 

 stand? 



Instinct is unsafe, for an act based on 

 impulse is quite as likely to be immoral 

 as to be moral. The social evolution of 

 man has progressed, in the last million 

 years, so much faster and farther than 

 the evolution of his inherent make-up, 

 that he has far outgrown, so to speak, 

 his native equipment, which in many 

 cases, in civilized society, is more 

 harmful than helpful. 



Custom is valuable to a certain 

 extent, as embodying part of the experi- 

 ence of the race. On the other hand, it 

 is bound always to lag a little behind 

 progress, which leads the young and im- 

 petuous to scoff, sometimes justifiably, 

 at the restraints of "conventionality" 

 as old-fashioned. Moreover, custom 

 has varied so widely, the moral act in 

 one nation or period being disgusting or 

 outrageous in another, that custom has 

 no great claim to sanctity. Our own 

 forefathers not long ago thought it a 

 sacred duty — or perhaps privilege — to 

 murder those who differed from them 

 on questions of dogmatic theology; 

 while peoples with a rather high type 

 of culture have considered it moral to 

 put to death their own infants, to steal, 

 to support prostitution as part of their 

 religion, and to practice almost all the 



