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possible for us to agree with Professor Allman, even while inclining 
to the “‘cell-soul” theory. “Admitting,” he says, ie., for the sake of 
argument, “that every living cell were a conscious and thinking 
being, are we therefore justified in asserting that its consciousness, 
like its irritability, is a property of the matter of which it is 
composed ?” and he goes on to argue to the contrary, on the 
ground of the want of analogy between the phenomena of living 
matter and those of consciousness. He would regard protoplasm 
as being only a requisite condition for the manifestation of the 
phenomena of consciousness, and supports his supposition by an 
illustration: ‘‘The rays which lie invisible beyond the violet in 
the spectrum of the sun have their refrangibility altered, and are 
made visible by being passed through certain infusions. Even the 
generation of these rays cannot,” he says, “be regarded as a 
property of the medium which by changing their refrangibility can 
alone render them apparent.” To which I may perhaps add 
another illustration: One’s first idea on observing the phenomenon 
of the formation of yeast on a sugary liquid, would be, that the 
yeast-fungus was 7# the sugary liquid ; this, however, is not the 
case ; the fungus germs are floating in the air (as has been ascer- 
tained by experiments in which the air is excluded); and the 
sugary liquid merely supplies one of the requisite conditions for 
the manifestation of the fungus growth. So it may be that the 
protoplasm may be merely (when living) one of the conditions 
amidst which something subtler than air or even than the. 
luminiferous ether and which cannot possibly be excluded, may be 
enabled to play its part. 
This part of the question has been very fairly put by Professor 
Huxley in the ‘Nineteenth Century” for April, 1879. He men- 
tions three possible hypotheses on the relation between material 
and immaterial phenomena :— 
1. That an immaterial substance of mind exists ; and that it is affected by 
the mode of motion of the sensorium in such a way as to give rise to sensation. 
2. That sensation is a direct effect of the mode of motion of the sensorium, 
brought about without the intervention of any substance of mind. 
3. That the sensation is neither directly, nor indirectly, an effect of the 
mode of motion of the sensorium, but has an independent cause, and, properly 
