Instinct and Reason. 37 



arrival known by continued barking. He had evidently felt that 

 the sheep were put under his care, and that he could not leave 

 them except in the hands of their rightful proprietor. He had 

 deferred his departure for some time, apparently supposing that the 

 butcher intended to return the sheep, but finding that this was not 

 the case, he resolved to do so upon his own responsibility. 



Here, as it appears to me, is an undoubted example of the 

 exercise of true reasoning powers. No amount of mere instinct, 

 though aided by memory and experience, could teach the dog to 

 act in this way. He was performing an act unusual to him, ap- 

 parently because he felt this to be a ])eculiar and novel case. 



Another and much simpler instance of the exercise of reason 

 has been frequently observed in small birds. A robin, for example, 

 was seen perched on the bough of a tree overhanging a running 

 stream, watching for any food which might be brought down by 

 the current. On seeing some such object pass by, he pounced 

 down upon it in the water, but the force of the current drew the 

 morsel from his grasp. Upon this the bird flew some distance 

 down the stream and waited for the object to approach ; as it drew 

 near he flew up stream to meet it, and by thus resisting the force 

 of the current, bore the object successfully from the water. 



This knowledge of the nature of the power of running water, 

 leads us to consider the use to which the current of a river is 

 turned b}' beavers, who have been known to cut trees for their 

 buildings some distance up stream, and float the logs down with 

 the current, while they never cut them below their works, knowing 

 that they would be unable to convey them to their destination. 

 The beaver, however, is one of those animals in which the reason- 

 ing power is far inferior to the instinctive. Indeed, it seems to 

 be more wanting in reason than many others of its tribe. A tame 

 beaver, in the possession of Mr. Broderip, was in the habit of 

 building itself a house in the room in which it was confined. But 

 not content with building the hut usually constructed by the 

 animal in a wild state, it used also to build a dam in the room, 

 apparently wanting sufficient reason to suggest to it that in this 

 locality it had no river to fear. 



One peculiarity with regard to instinct is that it appears to act 

 more powerfully in those animals which live in large societies, as 

 beavers among the mammalia, and bees and ants among the insect 

 tribes, and in accordance with the general rule, this large instinc- 

 tive pd^ver is compensated for by a proportionate lack of reason. 

 In the case of bees, indeed, many naturalists have gone so far as 

 to deny that they exercise any reasoning powers at all. This, 

 however, appears to be confuted by a fact which has recently been 

 noticed with regard to these insects. It is well known that after 



