I LKMiri': or fuei-: .\.\'rin\>^ 



523 



\v;iv \vli:i(r\ri-. to tri'jit il a- an oullaw 

 nilliMli;' till' t'i'cc |ic()]ilrs of the World. 



So (lc])('n(l('iil ai'c nations upon one 

 anotluT in tlicse days of instautaiu'ons 

 comnninicatimi. ra]iid trans]iortation. 

 and internal ional coniinoi'co. that il 

 soenis to nic an\' nation would In' very 

 slow to »jo to war coin I'arv to I'rconi- 

 niondations which had hivn made upon 

 its case, with the certainty tliat tlu- war 

 would have to he ])rosecutod entirely 

 upon its own resources, tliat no liclp 

 ctMdd he derived in any way from any 

 other nation: not only so. hut tliat in 

 relations other than war, it would he 

 treated as a lejier. 



In repard to dilTerences between 

 states that are memhers of the League, 

 and states not members of the League, 

 the League of N'ations should be free to 

 follow precisely the same procedure as 

 though both nations were members of 

 the League; and whether or not the 

 nation outside the League requested it, 

 the League should take steps for the 

 investigation of differences and the 

 making of recommendations. If the 

 nation outside the League attacked a 

 nation within the League before the 

 case was investigated and recommenda- 

 tions made, or contrary to the recom- 

 mendations, then, again, the nations of 

 the League should be free to support 

 their ally with their armies and navies 

 and should be hound to support it by 

 complete boycott of the offending state. 



In the case of a controversy between 

 two nations altogether outside the 

 League, probably it is not wise to pro- 

 pose that the League should do more 

 than tender its good offices to settle the 

 diHerence which threatens war, pre- 

 cisely as if the two states were members 

 of the League. This offer might not 

 always be accepted ; but if it were ac- 

 cepted by one state and not accepted by 

 the other, it is inevitable that the state 

 that was attacked contrary to the recom- 

 mendation would have at least the moral 

 su])])ort and influence of the nations of 

 the League; and no war has ever illus- 



trate(l the luiLihty power ol moi'al sup- 

 port a> has this war which is just being 

 linished. 



'I'lie second fundamental point upon 

 which agreement nnist be reached by 

 the League of Nations is in regard to 

 aiinaments. At the end of this war, the 

 great iiatioii> in\o|\('d will ha\e mighty 

 ariiiaiiieiit> up(Ui laud ami -ea. 'I'hey 

 lia\c maintained tlioe armaiiieiits 1)V 

 borrowing enormous sums of money. 

 .\fter the termination of the war. the 

 ciiri'eiit expenses for any country luiist 

 he I'ediieed to the illcoiue derived from 

 taxation: and that income must in ad- 

 dition provide for the interest upon the 

 colossal war debt, and if possible some 

 increment toward liquidation. It is 

 therefore clear that armaments as they 

 exist at the end of the war cannot be 

 maintained. They must be reduced, 

 however jingoistic a nation may be. It 

 is obvious that it cannot be proposed 

 that armaments shall l)e equal for all 

 nations. It cannot be suggested that 

 liiberia and Great Britain shall have 

 armies and navies of the same size. The 

 reduced armaments should be propor- 

 tioned to the importance and power of 

 the nations. 



As a first approximation toward this, 

 we may suggest that the disarmament 

 be proportioned, and that the disarma- 

 ment under this principle be carried as 

 far as possible. To illustrate for the 

 navies : Great Britain at the end of the 

 WAV will have a fleet upon the sea sub- 

 stantially three times that at the be- 

 ginning of the war. To maintain a fleet 

 in times of peace is almost as expensive 

 as during war. The men must be paid, 

 the ships kept in repair. It shoidd 

 therefore be agreed that the British sea- 

 going fleet shall 1)0 reduced to say one 

 thii'fl. one fourth, one fifth, one tenth, 

 nv any other fi'aetion which may be de- 

 cide(l upon, of the power of the fleet at 

 the end of the war: the reduction to 

 apply so t'ai" as practicable to each class 

 of slii])s. In regard to the ships which 

 are ])ut out of commission, the guns 



