PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY. 19 
cannot help concluding that there is another sense possessed by them, 
which may be slumbering in our physical nature, which may hereafter be 
developed, but which would be useless or injurious to us now, and therefore 
is not bestowed. Here then, I link, if not an argument, a theory, that 
the feathered migrants possess a sense which man does not; that not 
possessing it we cannot understand it, or that in the outer world which 
through this unknown sense awakens perception in their mind. Such a 
sense would guide it as surely and safely to its appointed summer or winter 
place of residence, as sight guides us to any wished-for object or place. 
From what is probabie in the inferior creatures may we speculate to what is 
probably in man. Is our nature fully developed? May there not come a 
time in man’s future history, when instead of five senses he may have fifty, 
or five hundred, or more, and each ef these senses would enable him to 
perceive and enjoy attributes and properties in the physical world to which 
we are now strangers, just as a man born blind is unacquainted with the 
glories and harmonies of colour. May not a sense or senses be developed in 
our physical nature hereafter, which may enable us not only to see distant 
worlds around, and so bring in faint enjoyment from those glorious orbs of 
heaven, but with superior organisation we might bridge over the ocean 
of space between these worlds, and our own, and bring them so near to 
ourselyes, that we could enjoy them as if we stood upon them. Thus 
would God’s universe be indeed linked together, and distant worlds 
would not appear made in vain for man, but as part of his own inheritance 
they would seem intended as much for his personal happiness as the 
small planet that is now his home or his prison. 
Allow me to direct your thoughts to a very different topic. ‘These 
are very beautiful!’’ said a lady friend, in reference to the gorgeous 
colours of a beautiful Humming-bird, ** here I see attraction. But what 
beauty 1s there in these old bones?’ Objects are beautiful or not according 
to our standpoint of observation. Nature’s aspects are so varied, that 
minds with every shade and complexion of taste may find the most intense 
gratification from almost everything in creation. Is it mere external 
beauty that is sought for? Where is form or colour so exquisite as in 
the almost innumerable objects around us,—the golden tints of the insect, 
the inimitable hues of the bird, the exquisite beauty and graceful gentleness 
of the Fawn tribe. But is thére no beauty that delights the mind besides 
that which is perceptible through the eye? Is there nothing that a mind 
enlarged and elevated can delight to contemplate besides that of mere 
external form? Are there no beauties of analogy or affinity? Are there 
no mental pleasures in connection with suggestion? Are there no great 
lessons of instructions? Are there no great general principles which the 
mind discovers or learns? Are there not sources of gratification and moral 
enjoyment, with which the mere gratification of taste will scarcely bear 
