| 
19 
in. This experiment he repeated over and over again, with 
various modifications in detail, but always with the same result. 
It may be suggested that possibly the bee was unable to stop up 
a hole once formed, but that could not have been the case. M. 
Fabre took one of the pellets of mortar brought by the bee and 
successfully stopped the hole himself. The omission, therefore, 
was due, not to a want of power, but of intellect. But M. Fabre 
carried his experiment still further. Perhaps the bee had not 
noticed the injury. He chose, therefore, a cell which was only 
just begun, and contained very little honey. In this he made a 
comparatively large hole. The bee returned with a supply of 
honey, and, seeming much surprised to find the hole in the 
bottom of the cell, examined it carefully, felt it with her antenne, 
and even pushed them through it. Did she, then, as might 
naturally have been expected, stop itup? Notabit. The un- 
expected catastrophe transcended the range of her intellect, and 
she calmly proceeded to pour into this vessel load after load of 
honey, which of course ran out of the bottom as fast as she poured 
it in at the top. All the afternoon she laboured at this fruitless 
task, and began again undiscouraged the next morning. At 
length, when she had brought the usual complement of honey, 
she laid her egg, and gravely sealed up the empty cell. 
These cases of mistaken action might be multiplied to an 
unlimited extent, but my object is attained when I call your atten- 
tion to the fact, and by so doing lead you to look into the matter 
fer yourselves, and thus verify the somewhat important statement 
that insects and animals may display a marvellous degree of 
stupidity in the exercise of their so-called instincts, and that many 
of these instincts have by no means the sure and certain modes 
of action which is usually claimed for them. 
Mr. Haselwood then gave two or three cases of actions which 
do not accomplish the object which appears to be in view ; and 
amonst them the following example :— 
One species of Sphex preys on a large grasshopper. Having 
disabled her victim, she drags it along by one of the antenne, 
and M. Fabre found that if the antennz be cut off close to the 
head, the sphex, after trying in vain to get a grip, gives the matter up 
as a bad job, and leaves her victim in despair, without ever think- 
ing of dragging it by one of its legs. | Again, when a sphex had 
provisioned her cell, laid her egg, and was about to close it up, 
M. Fabre drove her away, and took out both the grasshopper 
and the egg. He then allowed the sphex to return. She went 
down into the empty cell, and though she must have known that the 
grasshopper and the egg were no longer there, yet she proceeded 
calmly to stop up the orifice, just as if nothing had happened. 
Next followed some cases of actions which sometimes do and 
