378 Mr. T. y. Wollaston on the Tarphii. 



right to elicit the same kind of reflections (hearing upon the absolute 

 ones) with tenfold force. 



I would wish it to be particularly home in mind that the foregoing 

 remarks apply only to creatures which bear a close structural resem- 

 blance to each other in countries far removed niter se, and have no 

 reference whatever to the question as to whether or not any of the 

 more nearly alUed Madeiran and Canarian Tarphii may have been 

 in their oiun respective provinces slowly brought about by some (so- 

 called) " selective " process acting uninterruptedly upon erratic races 

 (albeit in a manner strangely unintelligible to us) so as gradually to 

 intensify them. Although the lately revived hypothesis which would 

 at once reply to the latter in the affirmative might be appropriately 

 touched upon here, and although I might adduce, did space permit, 

 the strongest reasons against the unqualified acceptance of it, I 

 nevertheless will not do so now : for such considerations come rather 

 within the province of poetical speculation than of sober induction ; 

 and it is hojieless to discuss them, seeing that we have not so much 

 as a fragment of evidence to lead to their practical solution. Never- 

 theless if it will afford any comfort to those who may perhaps differ 

 from us, let us candidly admit that ivithin narrow limits there seems 

 nothing a priori unreasonable in the supposition that such may p)ossl- 

 hly have been the case ; and moreover we can do this conscientiously, 

 without compromising in the slightest degree the far higher doc- 

 trine (which, on other grounds, we accept as absolutely true) of 

 special creation. J'or to suppose that there are no modifying influ- 

 ences at work (and often exceedingly subtle ones) in nature, would 

 be almost as illogical as to assume that, because such exist, therefore 

 they are all-efficient, and that no other " evolving [or creative] 

 power " has ever acted, or can act, simultaneously with them. Such 

 a conclusion as this latter one may suit the growing materialism of 

 some of our modern " philosophers," the sum-total of whose belief 

 is based in reality upon truths of sense, but it will not satisfy the 

 craving after knowledge of those minds which are able to discern 

 another class of truths in the world around us (and the most certain 

 with which we are acquainted), for which mere " science " can 

 afford no explanation. Truths such as these are called, by way of 

 distinction, " truths of reason;" and (amongst others) it is a truth 

 of the highest reason, that a natural law without a limit to its opera- 

 tion is an absurdity. And therefore to argue that limits do not earist 

 simply because (by the nature of the case) we cannot define them, 

 is to confound two distinct classes of truth, and to treat a truth of 

 reason as though it appealed directly to the understanding like a 



